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ABSTRACT
We create troves of data with nearly every step we take, every button we click, and
every query we submit. These data can be used to cater to us with services that better
align with our desires. They can help us locate restaurants matching our tastes, build
up social networks with individuals sharing similar characteristics, find a soul mate or
distant relative, attain financial goals, detect our health conditions, and potentially
assist in developing individualized medicine. However, misuse of the data can induce
us to buy things we don’t need, offer us things that might harm our health, lead to
an addiction, or even imprison us in the absence of wrongdoing. These data might
also be breached, causing harm to us and our loved ones with revelations we might
have never shared with the world.
In this dissertation, in a series of three chapters, I detect opportunities and propose
approaches to reduce the potential risks and leverage the benefits of data collection
and data usage. I first analyze users’ reactions to the data breach in a matchmaking
website, exploring their engagement changes and potentially insufficient behaviors in
privacy protection following the breach. I then plot how years of data collection in
the Marketing realm and other business domains have led to great improvements to
our lives, but have also introduced harms – some of which are are still likely awaiting
revelation. I discuss potential avenues for improving the benefits of the vast data we
all create, while reducing the risks associated with those data. Finally, I explicitly
develop one of these solutions – a privacy preserving data fusion methodology –
intended to securely combine datasets while reducing the risks of de-identification.
This dissertation, I hope, will serve as a steppingstone towards making the Mar-
keting domain a safer zone in terms of privacy preservation. Marketing efforts were
xii
a major driver towards vast data collection and the associated benefits and harms;





Governments and firms collect troves of data on almost every activity we do. Over
the course of years notable for outstanding technological improvements, these data
have been used to enhance our efficiency, communication, and wellbeing. We are
now able to find products with ease – even without searching for them – through
recommendation systems that incorporate our purchase history and traits. We can
determine the best nearby restaurant and navigate there efficiently. We can learn
about potential health risks associated with our behaviors, genes, and food intake,
from data we provide on our sleeping patterns, genome, and eating habits. We can
connect to people in countless ways, locate long-lost school friends on social media,
and even find a romantic partner based on quick survey of preferences. Most of our
existential and social needs can be met with a click of a button. And all of these
are direct products of the remarkable recent advances in data collection, data usage,
marketing models, and machine learning, among other innovations.
However, with the great advantages of data collection also come the risks of in-
vasions to privacy. These risks usually generate headlines in the “catchy” form of
data breaches – when data are revealed to have been accessed by others who are
not supposed to be able to. But in addition to these extreme breaches of trust and
data, people are increasingly aware that invasions of privacy can also be felt when
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presented with unsolicited offerings and ads that are seemingly out-of-context (Nis-
senbaum, 2009), have questionable resources of information (Kim et al., 2019), or
have unclear or offending reasons to target us (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011).
Even without the feeling of invasiveness, data collected on our daily activities can
be used to cater to us with offerings that will unintentionally cause us financial and
personal harm (Cowgill and Tucker, 2019; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2021), increase the
likelihood for addiction, or deny us opportunities that others may receive. As an
example, even basic health insurance can be out of reach for some, if health data
are revealed without proper customer protection. Improper data collection and usage
hurt our society well outside the marketing realm. They may be used in secretive or
proprietary black-box algorithms to decide on imprisonment and potential societal
risks (Simmons, 2017), and have been shown to reinforce societal biases (Kiritchenko
and Mohammad, 2018; Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018; Raji and Buolamwini, 2019;
Dooley et al., 2021). But even if the risk of wrongful imprisonment or implicit biases
are not major concerns (though they probably should be), other unknown risks from
data usage, that cannot be accounted for by users when they are expected to provide
“informed consent”, may cause harm. So complex are modern data infrastructures
and agreements that, even companies that collect or use data can sometimes be
unaware to what ends their data are eventually put to use – whether in their own
proprietary black-box algorithms, or at the hands of a third-party.
Such reports on data misuse are increasingly making customers wary. Marketing
efforts – previously focused on products’ abilities – are now shifting to protecting
customers’ privacy. Companies such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple,
along with governmental entities such as the U.S. Census Bureau, are acknowledging
the increased awareness and evident need for enhanced privacy protection. In recent
years, extreme efforts have been made to align with regulations, customers’ expecta-
tions, and potential risks of data exposure. Marketing messages are shaped to inform
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customers of these efforts. And slowly, marketing models themselves are beginning
to align in order to preserve privacy.
In this dissertation, I discuss multiple methods that can be used by marketers,
regulators and businesses to enhance privacy without forgoing the great benefits of
data collection and usage. In Chapter II, joint work with Fred Feinberg, I explore
heterogeneity in reactions to a massive data breach. We use data stemming from a
matchmaking website, one for those seeking an extramarital affair, that was breached.
The data, which were provided by the website to us under a nondisclosure agreement,
include de-identified profiles of paying male users from the United States, and their
activities on the website since joining, and up to 3 weeks after the disclosure of the
data breach. A challenge in making causal inference in the setting of a massive and
highly publicized data breach is that all users were informed of the breach at the same
time. In such cases of “information shock,” there is no obvious control group. To
resolve this problem, we propose Temporal Causal Inference. This procedure allows us
to control for potential trends in both individual and temporal site usage, and allows
us to extract insights regarding the homogeneous (average) treatment effect, along
with nontrivial heterogeneity in responses to the data breach. We unsurprisingly
find a significant decrease in user engagement on the website (in terms of searches
and messages) and a significant increase in deletion of photos immediately after the
announcement on data breach. However, the decrease in engagement shows signs of
fairly quick attenuation – less than three weeks – after the data breach was announced.
We further explore individuals’ heterogeneous reactions. Results show that users who
perceive themselves as being more private on the website (by choosing not to share
public photos, but rather only private ones) were the last to delete their photos after
the breach, even though their photos had similar likelihood to have been breached.
This false sense of privacy made those with high self-perceived privacy susceptible to
greater risks.
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Whereas in Chapter II I discuss data breaches, which can be seen as an obvious
(and usually highly publicized) harm to privacy and brand trust, in Chapter III, also
joint work with Fred Feinberg, I discuss the benefits and risks of data collection and
data sharing. In addition to plotting explicitly the risks and benefits briefly mentioned
above, we offer opportunities and propose solutions to mitigate the risks and increase
the benefits – solutions that are especially suited for marketing efforts, but not only
exclusively so. In this non-empirical piece, I develop an approach to allow businesses
and individuals alike to avail of the vast opportunities possible using the tremendous
amount of data we create each day. I discuss privacy-preserving methodologies and
potential solutions to privacy risks, as well as avenues for further enhancements of
the benefits of data collection. As I note in the chapter, some of the risks associated
with data collection and data usage are yet to be revealed, as companies themselves
don’t always know how customers’ data are used when making strategic or individual-
level decisions. Chapter III, therefore, does not rely on merely “informed consent” of
customers (though this is a necessary component): if companies are ill-informed of
the consequences of the usage of customers’ data, it’s naive to expect such informed
consent from the customers themselves. Instead of focusing solely on informed con-
sent, the chapter focuses on solutions from multiple domains – behavioral sciences,
law, computer science, economics, and (of course) marketing. These solutions range
from opt-in for data collection, code and model transparency, federated learning,
identity management tools with blockchain, and privacy-preserving methods for data
publication, analysis, and fusion.
To exemplify one of my proposed ways of reducing the risks of data collection and
data breaches, in Chapter IV, joint work with Longxiu Tian, I introduce a privacy-
preserving method for data fusion. Data fusion – the act of combining multiple
datasets – is a powerful technique to make inferences that are more accurate, gener-
alizable, and useful than those made with any single dataset alone. However, when-
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ever data fusion involves any form of user-level data, the technique poses a privacy
hazard and increased risk of re-identification. Data fusion exercises in the realm
of digital marketing and elsewhere should therefore be enacted with care so as not
to reveal users’ identities as an unanticipated by-product of the fusion itself. We
develop Privacy Preserving Data Fusion (PPDF), with the goal of preserving user
anonymity while enabling the full suite of customer analytics allowed for by extant
data fusion techniques. The PPDF framework consists of a set of variational autoen-
coders (VAEs) with bidirectional transfer learning (BTL). Conceptually, it builds
upon advances in both Bayesian canonical correlation analysis and data matching
autoencoders. Our framework does not require that the same users will appear in
both datasets to make inferences on the joint data. It overcomes sample selection bi-
ases by recovering missing data in one dataset from additional variation in the other
dataset. Moreover, PPDF is model-agnostic; that is, it allows for inferences to be
made on the fused data, without the analyst needing to specify the model/analysis
a priori to fusion. Most importantly, it does so while having Differential Privacy –
state-of-the-art methodology for privacy preservation – built in, and without the orig-
inal datasets ever coming in contact on a single machine or within a model, thereby
reducing the risk of compromising users’ privacy and anonymity.
Prior approaches to privacy took one of two extreme approaches. The first is must-
not-collect-data-in-the-first-place, and is exemplified by Shoshana Zuboff’s seminal
work, in which the term “Surveillance Capitalism” was coined. Zuboff (2019) referred
to most of the data collected today as “Behavioral Surplus”, and characterized acts
of attracting people based on their data as a thinly-veiled gambit to make them waste
money. The other approach is “privacy-is-dead” – privacy is long gone and you might
as well enjoy the fruits the data bring. This approach is exemplified by “privacy
nihilism” behavior – coined by Bogost (2018), and even before, by Scott McNealy
(Sprenger, 1999), then CEO at Sun Microsystems, who suggested that “Privacy is
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dead, deal with it.”
Evidence for customers’ behaviors in the spectrum of these approaches have been
documented throughout the years, in a plethora of marketing, economics, and socio-
logical essays. Customers state they care about privacy while clicking “I accept these
terms and conditions” without ever reading them (Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2020)
or while choosing the least private alternative (Athey et al., 2017). Some may show
concern about targeted ads (Kim et al., 2019), while others might be more likely to
click those ads if they have a sense of control over their privacy (Tucker, 2014).
In addition to varying customers’ behaviors, between the two extreme approaches
of “collect no data” and “privacy nihilism” also reside a wide spectrum of prior work
on technologies for privacy preservation. These technologies were developed primarily
in the domains of information systems, cryptography, computer science, economics,
and marketing. Over the years, myriad technologies have been developed in order to
keep pace in the arms race against privacy attacks, whose sophistication evolved to
circumvent existing safeguards.
Anonymization is typically the first step in hiding identities in datasets: simply
removing identifiers eliminates the potential for detection, at least in theory. The def-
inition of identifier, though, in itself evolved over the years, ranging from full names,
social security numbers and home addresses, to email addresses, phone numbers and
social networks information. However, anonymization of one identifier was seldom
sufficient to effectively prevent individual-level identification. The combination of
variables has also been used to reveal identities of so-called “anonymized datasets”.
For example, the combination of 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date of birth might
effectively allow a shadowy third party to identify more than half of the U.S. popu-
lation within the U.S. Census data (Sweeney, 2000; Golle, 2006). Latanya Sweeney
coined “quasi-identifiers” to acknowledge those combinations of variables that allow
the unique identification of individuals. The prospect of machine learning methods
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unleashed on vast databases would theoretically allow effective individual-level iden-
tification even with relatively little geodemographic information.
K-Anonymity was proposed by Sweeney (Sweeney, 2002) to assure that, with
any combination of variables, at least K individuals in a database will share the
same values, making definitive individual-level identification impossible. This can be
practically accomplished by grouping levels of variables together (e.g., by storing age
groups of five years instead of date of birth, or obscuring digits from a ZIP code), even
endogenizing these procedures to account for the empirical nature of the data (e.g.,
larger bin widths where data are sparse, like for older members of a dating site). K-
anonymity has been used for release and publication of datasets, and is still being used
in password checkup tools such as “Have I been Pawned”, Google’s security checkup
(Li et al., 2019), and in obscuring health data. However, it has been criticized for the
ability to recover sensitive attributes if the K individuals who are sharing the same
quasi-identifiers happened to have exactly the same values for sensitive attributes we
did not want disclosed (in an attack referred to as “Homogeneity Attack”) (Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra, 2008). In addition, when there is background information on the
association between a sensitive attribute and the quasi-identifiers, such association
may allow to determine or at least narrow the set of possible values of the sensitive
attribute (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007), thus allowing for a “background information
attack”.
As another step in the race against privacy attacks, L-Diversity and T-Closeness
have been introduced (Li et al., 2007; Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). These methods
improve on K-anonymity by assuring that individuals within a group will have enough
diversity (at least L values, or having a wide enough distribution) in their sensitive
attributes. At around the same time, “Differential Privacy” was introduced (Dwork
et al., 2006b), and has been since refined to what is now considered the leading
privacy preservation methodology. Differential privacy defines and rigorously limits
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the chances of being identified as being in a dataset. With mathematical guarantees,
and using added noise and randomization, differential privacy has been used for data
publication, data synthesis, and now – with Chapter IV introduced here – it will allow
for privacy-preserving data fusion.
In my work, I embrace the data revolution while acknowledging its risks and
finding ways to mitigate or even eliminate them. People are actively seeking services
and products better tailored to their desires – services that can assist them in attaining
their goals. Taking the extreme only-privacy approach would mean forgoing all these
great advances. At the same time, I argue that there’s no need to forgo privacy
completely. We should strive to preserve privacy while still enjoying the full suite of
data-enabled wisdom in our data-driven world.
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CHAPTER II
When the Data Are Out: Measuring Behavioral
Changes Following a Data Breach
2.1 Abstract
As the quantity and value of data increase, so do the severity of data breaches and
customer privacy invasions. While firms typically publicize their post-breach protec-
tive actions, little is known about the social, behavioral, and economic aftereffects of
major breaches. Specifically, do individual customers alter their interactions with the
firm, or do they continue with “business as usual”? We address this general issue via
data stemming from a matchmaking website, one for those seeking an extramarital
affair, that was breached. The data include de-identified profiles of paying male users
from the United States, and their activities on the website since joining, and up to
3 weeks after, the disclosure of the data breach. A challenge in making causal infer-
ence(s) in the setting of a massive and highly publicized data breach is that all users
were informed of the breach at the same time. In such cases of “information shock”,
there is no obvious control group. To resolve this problem, we propose Temporal
Causal Inference: for each group of users who joined in a specific time period, we
create an appropriate control group from all users who had joined prior to it. This
procedure helps control for, among other elements, potential trends in both individual
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and temporal site usage that broadly fall under the rubric of “normal” usage trajec-
tories. Following the construction of suitable control groups, we apply and extend
several causal inference approaches. We adapt Causal Forests (Athey et al. (2019),
among other forest-based methods) into Temporal Causal Forests, to better align
‘temporal’ inference settings. The combination of Temporal Causal Inference and
Temporal Causal Forests methods allows us to extract insights regarding the homo-
geneous (average) treatment effect, along with nontrivial heterogeneity in responses
to the data breach. Our analyses reveal that there is a decrease in the probability
of being active in searching or messaging on the website, and a notable increase in
the probability of deleting photos, ostensibly to avoid personal identification. We
investigate several potential sources of heterogeneity in response to the breach an-
nouncement, and conclude with a discussion of both managerial consequences and
policy considerations.
2.2 Introduction
Seventy million customer accounts at Target were compromised in 2013, more
than twice as many eBay accounts were breached in 2014 (eMarketer, 2014), and
more than twenty million records of Uber’s passengers and drivers were breached
in 20161. The number of records revealed to be compromised in data breaches has
increased dramatically over the past several years: in 2012, some 20 million records
were compromised; in 2015 the number rose to 318 million, and in 2017 the number
reached nearly 2 billion (a figure reduced to “only” 1.37 billion records in 2018)2.
1www.fortune.com/2018/04/12/uber-data-breach-security
2www.privacyrights.org measures, presented here, include data records that were compromised
due to security breaches. Possible causes are unintended disclosure, hacking or malware, and physical
loss (both electronic, non-electronic, and stationary devices). All compromised records were from
businesses, educational institutions, government and military, healthcare providers and nonprofit
organizations. In reality, the number should be considerably larger; for many of the breaches listed,
the number of records is unknown. This list is not intended as a comprehensive compilation of all
breached data. For additional explanation regarding the associated measures, see www.privacyrig
hts.org/data-breach-FAQ{#}2
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Despite these severe incidences, little is presently known about users’ reactions in the
wake of a publicly disclosed data breach.
As with any “exogenous” information shocks – those that neither companies nor
their customers can anticipate – disclosures of data breaches may result in hetero-
geneous reactions among users and customers3. Such varying responses can arise
in several ways: experiments show that customers may vary in their perceptions of
privacy and in the risk associated with data breaches (Athey et al., 2017); surveys
suggest that customers may vary in their expectations of the company’s actions, re-
actions, and obligations both before and after the disclosure (Madden and Rainie,
2015); and they may vary in their engagement with the company, thereby needing
its services more, or less, than other customers (Janakiraman et al., 2018). Assessing
these sources of heterogeneity, and the range of reactions to a disclosure of a data
breach (or any exogenous shock) is critical for firms, their customers, and the pol-
icymakers enacting guidelines to minimize potential damage. However, despite the
importance of such measures, they are not easy to enact; in highly publicized shocks,
it’s uncommon to have a group of users who remained uninformed, and can thereby
serve as controls.
We develop and present a methodology for measuring changes in customers’ be-
havior following the public disclosure of an exogenous shock (an event that was not
anticipated by either the customers or the company), applying it to a severe data
breach that received worldwide media attention. This attention owed in large part to
the nature of the focal website, one primarily intended for those seeking extramari-
tal affairs. Thus, the breached, disclosed data included especially sensitive personal
profiles, exposing users’ desire to engage in a relationship outside their primary one
(at least for most users), as well as personally identifying information, such as credit
3The terms “customer” and “user” are used interchangeably throughout, except where ambiguity
might arise.
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card numbers, for all paying members4.
Our results suggest that relative to the appropriate counterfactual – which is
enabled by the proposed Temporal Causal Forests methodology – users were less
likely to engage in searches and messages on the website immediately after the data
breach was announced, and they were significantly more likely to delete their photos
than they otherwise would have. We also explore differences in users’ reactions to
the breach, as well as potential reasons for this heterogeneity. In addition, by the
third week after the breach announcement, there was an attenuation of some of these
effects. We will discuss differences in privacy preferences that can be inferred from
our analysis, and that may be useful in determining both effective privacy regulation
and guidelines for companies’ reactions in future breaches.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 reviews
the literature on the effects of data breaches from the perspectives of the individual
and of the company, and the challenges to measure any such exogenous shock to
company’s perception. Section 2.3 describes our data, while Section 2.4 outlines the
construction of control groups via Temporal Causal Inference. Section 2.5 develops
Temporal Causal Forests, a non-parametric approach to assessing individual treat-
ment effects using Causal Forests with Local Linear Correction. Section 2.6 details
the results of these analyses, Section 2.7 provides various robustness checks, while
Section 2.8 closes by discussing the results and the methods used, and avenues for
future work.
2.2.1 Literature Review – Data Breaches
The Generalized Data Protection Regulation of the European Union (The Euro-
pean Union, 2016-05-04), as well as Security Breach Notification Laws, devised by
4Between 2014 and 2018, several websites, intended for the same purpose of extramarital affairs,
have announced they suffered a data breach. Due to confidentiality, we do not disclose the name of
the focal website, as well as the exact time during which the announcement took place. Some other
technical details regarding the nature of the announcement are also removed for confidentiality.
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all US States (of State Legislatures, 2018), were put in response to the spate of data
breaches in recent years (among other reasons). Such laws require all governmental
or private entities to disclose instances of data breaches as soon as these are brought
to their attention, even if the breached data were not made public. These laws aim to
reduce identity theft, mainly financial misappropriation in which criminal entities use
personally identifiable information in order to adopt the identity of another person5.
While lab studies have shown that data breach notifications are often neither clear
nor particularly alarming to those whose data were breached (Zou and Schaub, 2019),
Romanosky et al. (2011) found that such data breach notices successfully reduced the
number of identity thefts caused by data breaches by 6.1%. In this study, we aim to
develop a method to measure the consequences of such data breach notification, on
the behavior of users/customers, of the affected company.
To the individual affected, data breaches may cause more than financial losses.
They are perceived as privacy invasions, leading to lack of trust and potentially infor-
mation leaks of many sorts: purchase behavior, daily routines, email correspondences,
etc., along with identifiable information, all typically construed as “private”. Tay-
lor (2004), in a survey, found substantial heterogeneity in customers’ preferences for
privacy: some prefer to disclose their personal information and purchase behavior in
order to gain lower prices and more accurate product suggestions, while others prefer
to protect their anonymity by not disclosing such information. Acquisti and Varian
(2005) confirmed the economic effects of individuals’ ability to protect their privacy,
and heterogeneity in users’ preferences to remain anonymous, in the context of price
discrimination based on past purchases that were monitored by the company. They
5To illustrate the extent and magnitude of financial outcomes of identity thefts, an estimated 17.6
million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one or more incidents of
identity theft, which resulted in cumulative loss of more than $15.4 billion, in 2014 alone (Harrell
et al., 2015). Notifications of data breaches encourage persons whose data were compromised to seek
a remedy and protection of their financial identity through the use of identity theft tools. According
to a survey reported by Ablon et al. (2016), 62% of respondents who had their data compromised
following a breach accepted free credit monitoring offered by the company whose data were breached.
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are challenged to find an optimal strategy, partially because the sources of hetero-
geneity in the willingness to disclose information are not clear. Athey et al. (2017)
confirm, in a randomized experiment, heterogeneity in participants’ willingness to
disclose private information, such as the contact information of friends, for small fi-
nancial incentives. Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) found that younger people tend to be
more private, in the context of revealing their income.
Such heterogeneity among users can be found not only in the willingness to share
information before any breach was associated with the company, but also following
notification of a breach. One might surmise that companies whose data were breached
would be deemed unworthy of continuing customer trust; yet, according to a survey
by Ablon et al. (2016), 89% of respondents continued to conduct business with a
breached firm, while 11% stopped cold. One percent of respondents reported increas-
ing the amount of business they conducted with the breached firm, although this
cannot be separated from ordinary engagement trajectories, a topic we return to for
causal inference purposes. Immediately following Facebook’s allegations of privacy
misconduct in the infamous “Cambridge Analytica” case, a Reuters/IPSOS survey
(May 2018) found that about half of Facebook’s American users said they had not
changed the amount that they used the site, and another quarter said they were using
it more. The remaining quarter claimed they were using it less, stopped using it, or
even deleted their account.6 However, these measures were based on surveys, and
customers may fail to state their actual behavior accurately.
Notification of data breaches results in direct and indirect financial outcomes to
the firms whose data are compromised. Acquisti et al. (2006), Choong et al. (2016),
and Rosati et al. (2017) showed that, following disclosures of data breaches, there are
short-duration reductions in the company’s stock market valuation, based on both the
6“Three-quarters Facebook users as active or more since privacy scandal: Reuters / Ipsos
poll”, May 2018: www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-poll/three-quarters-facebook-users-
as-active-or-more-since-privacy-scandal-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN1I7081
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bid-ask spread and trading volume. Others, such as Gordon et al. (2011), agreed that
there is a short-term reduction in stock market valuation, but measured a decrease
in the magnitude of the effects of such breaches over the years: the authors suggest
that familiarity with breaches, and the uptick in their frequency of occurrence, might
diminish the negative impact of a breach on customers’ loyalty to the firm. Amir et al.
(2018) question the small reductions in market valuation and suggest that under-
reporting of severe cases moderate outcomes. Extrapolating from data breaches that
were revealed by the hackers and other entities outside the publicly-traded companies,
they find a long-duration negative effect of data breaches on market value. Following
a data breach, a harm in trust has been similarly documented. A survey conducted
by Pew Research Center (Madden and Rainie, 2015) suggests that online service
providers are among the least trusted entities when it comes to keeping information
private and secure. When asked about search engine providers, online video sites,
social media sites and online advertisers, the majority felt “not too confident” or “not
at all confident” that these entities could protect their data. In a separate question,
few respondents have reported to have “a lot” of control over the information that is
being collected by such firms. These findings also suggest substantial heterogeneity
in reaction to privacy violations.
Firms whose data were breached can suffer financially through loss of revenue, but
also via punitive measures like monetary fines (Romanosky et al., 2014). Yet firms can
mitigate or even reverse reputational damage through their reaction in the breach’s
immediate wake: most respondents highly value prompt notification, to the extent
that there is sometimes an increase in valuation following a breach (Ablon et al.,
2016). Publicly “shaming” companies using various media will only be useful if the
company did not disclose the breach of its own volition and did not take appropriate
precautions both before and following the breach itself. Some preliminary evidence
suggests that firms can benefit from negative buzz; for example, Han et al. (2020)
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found that, in some cases, negative attitudes towards a product or company may
result in increased awareness and downstream purchase intent.
Kude et al. (2017) measured the ability to restore customers’ sentiment (i.e.,
overall feeling towards the firm) after a breach: following the data breach to Target,
which occurred in 2012 and affected 70 million customers, the authors surveyed 212
customers whose data were compromised. They found substantial differences in the
perception of compensation offered by the company, and that these perceptions varied
widely among respondents according to their personal traits. Zhong and Schweidel
(2020) conducted an analysis of twitter conversations and found that most referencing
the “Under Armor” Data breach were initiated by people who’d never discussed the
brand before, suggesting that the brand might be more frequently discussed in crowds
that had not previously been involved in such discussions. Moreover, the authors
find that the negative sentiment following the data breach was short-lived. Taking
the outcomes of Han et al. (2020) and Zhong and Schweidel (2020) together might
suggest that the longer-term outcomes of a data breach announcement could yield
a net gain in brand awareness, that is, a positive for the focal firm. Note that the
examples above – of both the negative effects and ways to mitigate them – are based
on stock market valuations, surveys, twitter sentiment or lab studies. One of the only
documented empirical measures to a change in behavior of customers following a data
breach, prior to this paper, is presented in Janakiraman et al. (2018): they suggest
that heterogeneity in individual response should be considered when assessing the
effects of a disclosure of a data breach. That is, customers may well have varying
reactions, depending on, amongst other elements, the sensitivity of the data that were
leaked, general level of concern about disclosure, and prior expectations in regard to
the firm’s safeguarding their personal data. Possible reasons for the lack of empirical
measures will be discussed in section 2.2.2.
In summary, the literature on the effects of data breaches suggests that users will
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differ in their reaction – with some even seeming to increase interaction with the
breached company. Moreover, such differences can vary based on personal circum-
stances and perceived actions taken by the firm. While it is of obvious importance
for firms to comprehend and anticipate such reactions, what is lacking is a suite of
methods to disentangle typical individual-level usage trajectories from downstream
post hoc behavior when essentially all users were “treated”, that is, made aware of
the breach.
2.2.2 Literature Review – Measuring the Effects of Exogenous Shocks
Firms face constant changes in the way users perceive them. Some of these changes
are governed by the firm and can be either beneficial or detrimental to the customer:
product enhancements and price increases provide, respectively, two such examples.
Other changes are exogenous, unanticipated by the company, and may be caused by
a criminal act, legislation, natural disasters, or an unexpected flaw in production,
among other reasons.
Understanding the range of reactions to an exogenous shock, including data brea-
ches, is a quantitative problem that merits methodological and substantive attention.
It is possible to measure reactions to changes under the company’s full control, using
A/B testing (randomized controlled trials), test markets, or other means. But, fol-
lowing a highly-publicized exogenous shock, it is difficult or impossible to identify a
group of users who remained unaware of it, and so can serve as a control group for
measurement purposes; moreover, users who somehow managed not to be informed
of a major shock (such as a product recall, data breach etc.), cannot be viewed as
representative of the larger pool they would be intended to represent. Lack of such
control groups makes it difficult to evaluate and measure the consequences of the
shock (Cleeren et al., 2017).
In addition, observable behavioral changes can arise for many reasons, irrespective
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of the data breach notification or other exogenous shock. Therefore, when aiming to
measure the causal effect of such a shock on individual behavior, it is important to
measure it in comparison to the behavior that the users would likely have engaged in,
had the announcement of the shock not been made, while accounting for heterogeneity
both in the users’ activities, and in their reactions to the shock.
Several solutions have been proposed in the Marketing, Accounting, and Eco-
nomics literatures: In the context of data breaches specifically, Janakiraman et al.
(2018), discussed earlier, compared the changes in sales over time in breached vs. non-
breached channels. Measures of change in stock market value were also presented due
to the availability of such data, for public companies (Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Amir
et al., 2018). However, these measures assume consistent behavior of the corpus of
customers among channels, assume no spillover effects between channels, or require
that the breached company be public. As mentioned earlier, other methods relied
on surveys or lab studies, and their generalization to real data breach notifications
is limited. In the context of other exogenous shocks, such as product recalls and
product-harm crises, Cleeren et al. (2017) note several empirical analyses, along with
surveys and lab studies. Of the methods presented in this review paper, measures
of aggregate change to sales, compared to other brands, were proposed, as well as
financial event study methods (again, relevant mainly for public companies). To re-
iterate, all these methods either assume that there are comparable products, assume
consistent behavior and no spillover effects, or provide only aggregate results.
Our overarching goal is therefore to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects
of an exogenous shock, on users that were already members of the focal site, while
also acknowledging that they could well have changed their behavior even had the
shock not occurred, due for example to typical or predictable behavioral trajectories.
Our method is applied here to address the substantive question of the effects of a
data breach, but is applicable to other contexts, so long as individual-level data are
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available both before and after the shock.
In the following sections, we will describe the data to be used in our setting,
introduce our identification strategy – Temporal Causal Inference – which allows the
analyst to overcome the key stumbling block of lacking a “non-informed” control
group, and adapt a set of non-parametric causal inference methods into Temporal
Causal Forests, in order to assess the heterogeneous treatment effects attributed to
the announcement of the data breach.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Website and Data Breach
The focal data come from a matchmaking website aimed at those seeking extra-
marital affairs, either online or in-person. The website suffered a massive data breach,
which was announced in a manner ensuring widespread attention: unauthorized par-
ties (henceforth, “hackers”) declared that they had downloaded detailed personal
information of all users of the website. This personal information included email ad-
dresses, credit card information, preferences for affair types, among other potentially
identifying and/or socially embarrassing elements. The announcement was highly
publicized, and reached major media outlets in the US and abroad. In addition, the
website made several announcements to their users and to the general public. There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume that news of the breach reached the entirety of the
web site’s user base in short period of time7.
It is important to note that we are not using any of the hacked data; rather, the
data we use were provided directly by the firm, and conforms to a non-disclosure agree-
ment. Our collaboration with the website afforded detailed user behavior records, as
7We also verified this assumption, to the extent possible, with detailed analyses of the various
media publication dates, range thereof, and Google Trends around the name of the website, which
spiked less than a day after the announcement.
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well as de-identified profiles of all paying members. Our data window commences
approximately two years before the announcement of the breach, through ˜3 weeks
of activity following the announcement. Importantly, the leaked data were not made
public during this time, so we can treat the announcement of the data breach as a
single exogenous shock unrelated to the aftereffects of publication of the data them-
selves.
2.3.2 Behavioral Data
For purposes of consistent reference, “behavioral data” pertains to activities taken
on the focal site itself, including searches made, messages sent by the users, as well
as such deliberative actions as deletion of photos. Our sample consists of all paying
male users from the United States who had joined the website 2-6 months before the
breach was announced, and had at least one “activity” (searches, messages, etc. –
anything beyond the mere creation of the profile) on the website before the breach was
announced. The relatively long span of join dates allows for an account of regularities
in activity patterns before the breach, e.g., satiation, attrition, and/or other trends
and fluctuations in individual-level behavior. Each user is assigned a unique ID that
does not change over time, allowing us to view all the activities users made throughout
the data window.
The focal website is a so-called “freemium” site, where one can join for free and
enjoy limited functionality. A feature on this dating site is that women obtain almost
“full” access for free, while men must pay a monthly access fee. Only such “full”
members –can contact other members, but any user on the website can browse anyone
else’s content, except for, in some cases that will be described shortly, other users’
photos. Due to this feature of the website, and the nature of the breached data, our
analysis and statistical estimates pertain to male users that had paid for membership,
and all such users had to provide their full name and home address in order to process
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payment; this is not so for nonpaying users, many of whom were pseudonymous, and
so we limit our purview to legitimate, accurately recorded male users. Consequently,
these users were informed, on the day of the announcement of the breach, that their
real names and addresses were in the hands of the hackers – entailing the risk of
widespread exposure – along with other personal information, and an indication that
they were seeking an affair.
The sample used for analysis consists of ˜57K users, apportioned into 24 weekly
cohorts (groups of users who join in the same week), based on week of joining. Fig-
ure 2.1 illustrates the percent of active users per cohort per week throughout the data
span. As can be seen, the average number of active users prior to the breach initially
increases and then gradually decreases. The breach happened 27 weeks from when
the first cohort joined and, as stated previously, the data window extends to 3 full
weeks after the breach announcement – and before the data were made public. From
observation, the average number of users who deleted photos increased immediately
following the announcement. However, for the average number of users who made at
least one search or sent at least one message each week, the effect is not clear, due to
the inconsistent number of activities prior to the breach, and to the natural decrease
that would have presumably occurred even without the breach, rendering it difficult
to determine whether the breach affected users’ behavior or not.
2.3.3 User Profiles
Upon joining the website, users provide a full profile, which includes gender, mar-
ital status, date of birth, height, weight, ethnicity and many other geodemographic
covariates. The specific covariates used in the analysis are marital status (attached
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Figure 2.1: Percent of active users, for each cohort, as a function of the number of
weeks relative to the announcement of the data breach. Different colors indicate week
that cohort joined the website. Vertical lines indicate the announcement of the data
breach.
or single8, where 67% of users are attached, and 33% single)9, and a binary indicator
of whether the user’s public profile includes a photo. Users could choose whether
any user on the website can see their photos, or only users that shared their photos
reciprocally. Of all users, 85% had public photos, and 15%, referred to as “private”
8Marital status is declared by these (categorical) statements: (a) Attached male seeking female;
(b) Single male seeking female, (c) Male seeking male. Only about 0.1% of the users in the estimation
had status (c). Since (c) does not clearly state marital status, we coded (b) and (c) together as
“single”.
9One possible concern is our ability to know whether the users are honest about their marital
status on their profile, and whether they are in an “open relationship”. To verify both, we com-
plement our data with a survey we conducted on a random sample of the website’s users, in an
anonymous setting, with a declaration of academic objectives, long before and independently of the
announcement of the breach. The survey results show similar percentage of married users in the
survey and in the website (62% married, 7% living with a partner, and 3% in “serious relationship”
in the survey, and 67% identify themselves to be “attached” in their profile on the website). This
means that there is no clear bias in the disclosing of one’s marital status on the website. Even if
there was a bias, the disclosure of one particular marital status is the effect we are interested in,
and therefore, revealed status is the variable we use. In order to test for “open relationship”, we
again refer to the survey. Of those who stated themselves to be in a committed relationship, only
7% said their spouse knows they were on the website. This allows us to largely rule out possible
“open relationships” or other forms of socially acceptable affair-seeking among attached men.
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users, required reciprocity in sharing all of their photos. These covariates would be
expected to correlate with an important latent element of public disclosure: that
some users had “more to lose” than others. Note that, because the user can change
his profile (be it due to real changes in his life, changes to his privacy preferences, or
other reasons), the covariates included in the analysis are potentially time-varying.
To maintain consistency in such covariates such as marital status, we use only the
user’s last profile prior to the breach. This is critical for a reason beyond mere consis-
tency: users necessarily presumed that the hackers had this final profile and therefore
it is this specific data that could potentially have gone public.
2.4 Temporal Causal Inference
2.4.1 Measuring Effects of an Exogenous Shock
Our goal is to estimate the effect of the data breach on the probability a user will
be active on the website. We refer to the announcement of the breach as a single,
exogenous treatment, for which we want to estimate the effect. As detailed earlier, the
main challenge is that there is no clear control group, since it is reasonable to assume
(due to the high publicity of the event and the nature of the public announcement)
that all users were informed of the data breach at essentially the same time.
Despite being informed at the same time, users were in a different phase of their
membership “age” on the website (i.e., number of weeks since initial joining). Site
activity varies substantially across membership ages: for most users, the number of
activities increases over the first few weeks, and then decreases, with varying slope
contours; other users increase their number of activities over time, and others might
have distinct patterns of activities throughout their membership lifetime. The focal
point is that the breach itself occurred at different points in these trajectories; al-
though the shock hit all users, it did so at different points in their experience and
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consequent activity pattern on the site. While users differ in their trajectories, having
a relatively large number of users in each cohort (average number of users per cohort
is 2,161; standard deviation 295; smallest cohort has 1832 users) permits matching
users’ trajectories on the website, across the different cohorts. This in turn allows
us to construct “Temporal Causal Inference”: for each cohort, we compare their be-
havior to a group of users who joined in previous weeks. For this group of users
who joined earlier, which will be referred to as the “control group”, we observe a
larger number of weeks of activity prior to the announcement of the breach. The
cohort who joined later, referred to as the “treated group” (the treatment being the
announcement of the breach), was affected by the announcement of the data breach
earlier in their lifetime on the website, compared to the control group. In particular,
let JT denote the cohort of users who joined T weeks before the data breach was
announced. For this cohort, we observe T + 3 weeks, where the last 3 weeks are after
the breach announcement. Let groups J1, ... , JT−3 be all the cohorts that joined at
least 3 weeks before JT . From these cohorts, we use the first T + 3 weeks of activity
since joining the website and form a control group JCT .
10
It is important to note that all users in the control group were also affected by
the breach. However, they were only affected later in their lifetime (membership age)
on the website. For this control group, JCT , the time of (not receiving the) treatment
will still be T , and the 3 weeks to follow (which were all before the breach) will aid us
in predicting what would have been the (expected) behavior of the treatment group,
had the breach not been announced.
We illustrate the construction of the groups in Figure 2.2: the upper panel illus-
trates the average number of activities for one treatment cohort, and three earlier
cohorts, over time; the earlier cohorts are formed into a single control group. The
lower panel illustrates that, if the X-axis variable is Membership Age (i.e., not cal-
10In practice, in order to have similar number of users, we take as control group the last 5 cohorts
that joined prior to the treated group. Results are robust to any number of cohorts larger than 3.
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endar time), the groups are comparable, except that the control group was not yet
exposed to the breach. For the control group, we use only the data up to the treatment.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of Temporal Causal Inference, with one treatment cohort, and
3 control cohorts.
We repeat the construction of the control and treatment groups 21 times: for each
of the cohorts who joined in a specific week 1-6 months prior to the data breach, we
employ all the users who joined at 3-8 weeks prior to them. Such repetition results in
21 different control groups – one for each of the 21 treatment groups. This explicitly
means that almost all cohorts serve multiple times as part of a control group (for
varying lengths of their membership age), and that all cohorts except for the first
three (to which we have no one in our data sample to serve as a control group), serve
only as a treated group.
Figure 2.3 shows a visual comparison between control and treatment groups, as
constructed by Temporal Causal Inference (TCI), while Figure 4 depicts only the
last three weeks prior to the announcement. Figure 2.5 shows the average number
of activities for each of the three weeks prior and post announcement, across all
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cohorts. This figure provides “model-free evidence” demonstrating the change in
the probability of being active in each of the activities on the website, in the weeks
following the announcement.
Figure 2.3: Percent of active users per Control/Treatment group, as a function of
week from treatment. Solid vertical lines indicate the announcement of the breach.
Different colors indicate week of joining the website for each of the 21 treatment
groups.
2.4.2 Causal Inference Assumptions With TCI
Our causal inference mechanism builds on the “potential outcome framework”,
a term attributed to Neyman (Rubin, 2005). According to the potential outcome





outcome of unit iwithout and with receiving the treatment Wi ∈ {0, 1}, respectively.




i . A fundamental problem
of causal inference is that, in any experiment – may it involve randomly assignment




i , as the user is either
exposed to the treatment, or not. Therefore, the researcher should estimate the
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Figure 2.4: Percent of active users before and after the announcement. Solid vertical
lines indicate the announcement of the breach. Different colors indicate week of
joining the website for each of the 21 treatment groups.





i , and use the counterfactual outcome to infer the causal effect. In order to do that,
we should also estimate the probability to be treated, which we denote ŵi ∈ (0, 1)
(the restriction of not being 0 or 1 is explained in Section 2.4.2.3).
In the case of a data breach that affected – even if merely by attention – the entire
website population, there is no random assignment to treatment, and we therefore
construct TCI. In this section, we illustrate how TCI can assist in adhering to Causal
Inference assumptions, in order to be able to measure the treatment effect of any
exogenous shock. In our case – the measurement of the treatment effect of the an-
nouncement of a data breach. We will briefly review four main assumptions of Causal
Inference: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption, Overlap Assumption and Exogeneity of Covariates Assumptions.
For each, we will show how TCI helps in identifying the treatment effect and assures
adherence to the assumption, in the case of an exogenous shock. In cases where there
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Figure 2.5: Average percent of active users across all cohorts.
might be additional concern for clear identification of the treatment effect, we will
discuss possible solutions we propose to overcome them.
2.4.2.1 SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption)
The SUTVA assumption (Rubin, 1980) comprises two conditions:










two users ij ∈ 1, . . . N . In the case of measuring the effects of an exogenous shock,
this assumption means that if one user/customer is exposed to the shock, this should
not affect the outcome of any other user. By design of TCI, assignment to treatment
or control groups is based on the time of joining the website. Since the outcomes do
not occur at the same time, no two users who were in the different groups – control
and treatment – are affected by the other’s treatment or lack thereof. That is, for
every set {i, j} Y (1)i ⊥Y
(0)
j . On the other hand, behavior following the data breach of






some treated users ij. This is because of the nature of the website: a match-making
website, where one user’s change in behavior (e.g., stopping using the website) might
affect another user’s behavior (e.g., enjoys the website more, now that there is less





j . Since our objective is to measure the effect of the data breach,
and in general – the effect of other exogenous shocks – this possible dependency is
not a concern; rather, it should be part of the estimation of the treatment effect.
b. No hidden versions of treatments. Also known as the Consistency As-
sumption. This assumption states thatYi = Y
(1)
i ·Wi + Y
(0)
i · (1 − Wi), the outcome
that would be observed for treated unit would be Y
(1)
i and for control unitY
(0)
i ; i.e.,
nothing, except for the treatment, affects the outcome. This assumption usually
cannot be tested. As in almost every causal inference scenario other than perfectly
randomized control trials (only those which are repeated in multiple occasions. places,
and with large enough sample), there might be other, unobserved events that affect
users’ behavior. For example, during the time period of the breach there might have
also been a change to the platform or a holiday that otherwise affected users’ outcome
Y
(1)
i independently of the data breach. To the best of our knowledge, and according
to data from prior periods, at the time of the breach there was no change to the
platform, no notable holiday, no other such events, except for the data breach itself.
As for users in the control groups, the construction of TCI – to include multiple co-
horts as “control cohorts”, each joining at a different time – mitigates the likelihood
of having any unrelated event affecting Y
(0)
i . This is because, by using multiple con-
trol cohorts, and by repeating TCI for multiple treatment cohorts, such events are
smoothed through the average of all other control cohorts. Moreover, we show subse-
quently, in a series of analyses, that, once constructing TCI, the control and treatment
groups are indistinguishable in their behavior prior to the treatment. Nevertheless,
in order to estimate the individual treatment effect, we complement our Temporal
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Causal Inference with Causal Forests methodology, thus matching individual users to
an ensemble of users from the control group.
As noted by Rubin (2005), under randomized controlled trials (RCT), there is no
need for any assumptions other than SUTVA. However, we cannot avail of an RCT,
and therefore we need to assure our models have properties that are “given” in RCTs.
We therefore proceed with showing that TCI allows for recovery of the treatment effect
of an exogenous shock, while holding the necessary following assumptions:
2.4.2.2 Conditional Independence (or Ignorability) Assumption
Assignment to Control/Treatment Groups are random, conditional on X:
Pr
(
Wi |Xi, Y (0), Y (1)
)
= Pr (Wi |Xi, Yobs)
where Yobs is the observed outcome. This assumption was later extended to “uncon-




Wi |Xi, Y (0), Y (1)
)
= Pr (Wi|Xi)
The data breach, as an exogenous shock, affected all users. However, because some
users joined the website earlier, they were affected by the breach at a later point in
their membership age, for unobserved reasons that might be confounded with the
treatment effect (e.g., if for some reason, people that are more active, selected to
join in a specific month). Therefore, the construction of TCI might not overcome
this. In order to assure that the control group has similar behavior to that of the
control group, prior to the treatment, we test the parallel trend assumption using a
Granger Test (Granger, 1980)11. We find that, across all treatment groups and across
11Granger Causality Test is a common way to compare two time series. Despite “causality” in
its title, it is a well-known test of predictability, or “temporal relatedness”, of one time series to
another and should not be misconstrued as a test of causality. We implemented a bi-directional
test of predictability of the control group on the treatment group. We found that for all treatment
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all activities, the control groups we constructed using Temporal Causal Inference
are acting as perfect predictors for the behavior of their respective treatment group,
and vice versa. We also conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (Massey Jr, 1951) to
verify that the control and treatment groups do not differ in distribution. Specifically,
for each activity and for each treatment-control pair, we compute a cumulative sum
of the average percent of active users prior to the treatment and divide it by the
groups’ maximum cumulative sum; this effectively creates a CDF-like timeline, as
shown in Figure 2.6. We then conduct a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to test whether
the CDF-like timelines differ between the control and treatment groups. We find
that, throughout all activities and treatment groups, the trends are indistinguishable
from those of the respective control groups.
Figure 2.6: Comparison of control and treatment groups: CDF-like comparison of
treatment and control groups. Each line is the cumulative sum of the percent of active
users for this group, divided by the maximum cumulative sum for this group (therefore
always gets to 100%, and starting “higher” for cohorts with shorter timelines, due to
this).
groups and for all activities, the time series was statistically indistinguishable (the null hypothesis
of no-prediction was rejected with p < 0.001 across all tests).
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Even though we established that there are parallel trends between the groups, in
order to estimate individual treatment effects while also acknowledging that users
might have varying timelines, we will add a second step to our causal inference
method, one that will account for possible differences in in the timelines of users
prior to the treatment. In short, we will match users in the control and treatment
groups, nonparametrically, using Temporal Causal Forests.
2.4.2.3 Overlap Assumption (or “Common Support” Assumption)
According to this assumption, the propensities to be treated are strictly between
0 and 1:
0 < Pr (Wi = 1 |Xi = x) ≡ ŵ (x) < 1
In TCI, due to the nature of the exogenous shock, every user had some propensity
to have been treated in any week during his period on the site; evidently, all users
were treated. Nevertheless, in the “Causal Forests” section, we will further test
this assumption by observing the estimated w̃ (x) – the propensity to be treated –
estimated by Local Linear Forests.
2.4.2.4 Exogeneity of Covariates Assumption






The data breach was an exogenous shock that, to the best of our knowledge, was not
explicitly predicted by any user or employee. Even if there are users that did expect
something of this sort to happen, this is likely to be true in both the control and
treatment group, and therefore should be overcome using TCI. Therefore, it is not of
a concern in identifying the treatment effect.
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To summarize, Temporal Causal Inference aided us in finding proper control
groups to measure the treatment effect on the exogenous shock of the data breach. We
found that the construction of these groups ensures all necessary and sufficient causal
inference assumptions hold. In the next section, we will introduce Causal Forests – a
non-parametric method that will further allow us to find a matching control for each
user in our treated groups. Temporal Causal Forests will also allow us to measure
the heterogeneity in the treatment effect.
2.5 Temporal Causal Forests
Toward the aim of determining the heterogeneous effects of the announcement of
the breach, we take the control and treatment groups created via TCI and estimate
individual treatment effects using a nonparametric, forest-based method – Temporal
Causal Forests. We also ran several semi-parametric and parametric models. Simu-
lation studies were conducted to assure that the method chosen was able to recover
simulated treatment effects. All methods will be described in the robustness-checks
and simulation sections.
2.5.1 Comparing Control and Treatment Users
Since our goal is to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects, we must carefully
construct the comparison based on individual trajectories (probability to be active in
each week of membership on the website). We have 8-24 weeks of observations for
users in various treatment groups, based on their times of joining the website. We
use this timeline and compare it to that of similar users in the control group, in order
to estimate what would have been the probability to be active, following the treat-
ment (announcement of the data breach), if it were to not occur. In order to do so,
we use a forest-based method, specifically, Temporal Causal Forests. It is important
to note that Temporal Causal Inference and Temporal Causal Forests comprise two
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separate, sequential procedures: while TCI generates two groups (control and treat-
ment), Temporal Causal Forests, denoted TCF, estimate the heterogeneous treatment
effect, by estimating what would have been the number of activities had the user been
in the opposite group. Simply put, the difference between the estimated number of
activities, and the observed one, provides an estimate of the effect of the breach. The
second step, TCF, can be seen as a nonparametric propensity-score matching mecha-
nism; predictions are made nonparametrically based on the entire corpus of data, so
that each user in the treatment group will be fit with the suitable counterpart in the
control group.
We adapt the Causal Forest (CF) (Wager and Athey, 2018) model using Gener-
alized Random Forests (GRF) implementation (Athey and Wager, 2019). In recent
extensive simulation study, Causal Forests in this implementation have been found
to show strong performance, under all tested settings (Knaus et al., 2021).
We introduce two changes to the original Causal Forest method. These changes
are both internal and external to the estimation of the treatment effect, and were
found, in a series of simulation studies we ran (to be described in Section 2.7.5), to
give the best results in terms of RMSE and ability to recover heterogeneous treatment
effects, both in synthetic data and on our dataset. These changes are:
1. In most cases, the use of the Causal Forest is to generate groups that are
equivalent in their propensity to be treated, and to compare between the users
within each group. In our case, however, we choose the parameters Xi to
include both psycho-demographic covariates, and, more importantly, the time
trend, as will be explained below. This leverages the traditional Causal Forests
framework to group users based on their pattern of activities throughout time,
resulting in groups within the control and treatment groups that are relatively
homogeneous in respect to their time trend. In other words, TCF allows us to
assess individual treatment effects by estimating a counterfactual time trend
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of their activities. Therefore, TCF allows treatment and control groups to be
compared while verifying that the users have similar time trends before the
breach announcement (i.e., the treatment).
2. In order to improve Causal Forests, we estimate its “nuisance parameters” (to
be explicated later) using Local Linear correction, via Local Linear Forests
(Friedberg et al., 2020).
2.5.2 Construction and Estimation – Temporal Causal Forests
The TCF methodology, as carried out here, consists of sequential application of
four nonparametric forest-based methods: Random Forests, Causal Forests, General-
ized Random Forests and Local Linear Forests, each building atop its predecessors.
We now briefly explain each of these components, omitting widely known details from
the core Random Forests literature (e.g., Breiman (2001)):
a. Random Forests is a supervised machine learning method aimed at estimat-
ing a prediction µ̂ (x) for a vector of covariates Xi = x. The estimation can be seen as
an “ensemble method”, by taking the average of all regression/decision trees. Each
decision tree b is constructed so that the leaves Lb will include observations that have
similar set of covariates. Specifically, we present here “Honest Forests”: for each tree
b ∈ {1, . . . , B}, where B is the number of trees in the forest, draw a subsample Sb,
referred to as the training sample, in the size of half of the population (the size can be
tuned). Grow the regression tree by recursively splitting so that the error function (to
be defined for each problem separately) will be optimized (usually minimized). After
training the forest for each user with set of covariates x not in Sb, make out-of-bag









I {Xi ∈ Lb (x) , i /∈ Sb}
|{i : Xi ∈ Lb (x) , i /∈ Sb}|
(1)
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where Lb (x) is the leaf of the b-th tree, to which the set of covariates x correspond,
according to the splitting rule. Wager and Athey (2018) showed that, when using
Random Forest with “honesty” – that is, by using B trees, where the training set
is randomly chosen for each – one can derive the asymptotic distribution of the
response variables, thus allowing us to get both mean and variance of individual
estimates. In the sequel, we assume the “honesty” property, and remove notation of
Sb for simplicity.
b. Generalized Random Forests (GRF). Whereas Random Forests can be
seen as an ensemble method – average of predictions made by individual trees –













I {Xi ∈ Lb (x)}
|Lb (x)|
Therefore, the weights αi (x) are higher for the observations that appear more often
in the same leaf as x – and are thus “closer to it” – whatever the measure of splitting
mandates to be as “closer” (hence the term “generalized” in the name of the method).
Note that by construction,
N∑
i=1
αi (x) = 1, and αi (x) ≥ 0.
c. Causal Forests (implemented using GRF). Here we will follow the GRF
method for estimating Causal Forests, with honesty. Assume (Xi, Wi, Yi), where Xi
is defined as earlier, Wi ∈ {0, 1} is the treatment assignment of user i, and Yi = Yi(Wi)
is the observed outcome. For each user we observe either Yi(1) or Yi (0), but not both,
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and we aim to estimate the treatment effect, which can be simplified into:
τ̂ (x) = E [Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi = x]
Until now, we have not defined the splitting rule by which the tree splits were
constructed. Usually, it is set to minimize the Sum-of-Squared Error between the
observed and predicted outcome: Consider a parent node P with nP observations,
(Xi1, Yi1) , . . . , (XinPYinP ). For each candidate pair of child nodes, {C1, C2}, let
Ȳ1, Ȳ 2 be the corresponding mean of Y in that leaf. The chosen pair of child nodes












However, in causal inference, we do not observe both Yi (1) andYi (0), but rather only
one of them. Therefore, we cannot compare the predicted outcome to the quantity
we do not observe. In order to solve this, in Causal Forests the splitting rule is based
on pseudo-outcomes: within each leaf, the splitting rule is constructed so that the
propensity to be treated for those in the control and those in the treatment group,










where W̄P , ȲP are the averages taken over the parent node P , and β̂P is the least-
squares regression solution of Yi on Wi in the parent node P . V arP (Wi) is the
variance of the treatment in the parent node:
VarP (Wi) =
1











The splitting rule is then calculated along the gradient of the mean difference with the
pseudo-outcomes, to maximize homogeneity in the propensity to be treated in each
leaf. Specifically, the parent node will be split to two leaves {C1, C2} that maximize:









This splitting criterion is used recursively, therefore generating a tree, and later a
forest. The weighing mechanism specified in the description of GRF then takes place.
In the notion of “Causal Inference”, all the above decisions merely mean that the
splitting is done so that there will be similar propensity to be treated for each obser-
vation within each leaf (Guo et al., 2021). This assures that despite having possible
differences between the control and treatment groups, these are being minimized in
each leaf – in order to have a homogeneous control and treatment group in each leaf.
Nuisance Parameters in GRF Causal Forests. In order to improve efficiency
and be more robust to confoundedness, Athey et al. (2019) show that it is possible to
maintain accuracy and asymptotic inference by first regressing out (locally centering)
the effects of Xi on the outcomes that are used to perform the optimization. In order
to do so, they introduce nuisance parameters:
ŵ (x) = P [Wi|Xi = x] is the propensity to be treated, and
ŷ (x) = E [Yi|Xi = x] is the expected outcome, marginalizing over the treatment.
Then, center the outcome and treatment Ỹi = Yi − ŷ(−i) (Xi) and W̃i = Wi −
ŵ(−i )(Xi), where the (−i) superscript denote out-of-bag estimates of ŷ and ŵ, com-
puted without using the ith observation, as explained in the definition of “honest
forests” above.
Using these quantities, the forests can be run on the pair ỸiW̃i. Then, after
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As stated earlier, Wager and Athey (2018) derive asymptotics of τ̂ (x), and thereby
estimated individual treatment effects’ mean and variance, σ̃τ (x). The variance is
estimated using the infinitesimal Jackknife method, also known as the non-parametric
delta model (Wager et al., 2014). We refer the reader to section 6 of Athey et al.
(2019) and Athey and Wager (2019) for further detail on the construction of the
Causal Forest in Generalized Random Forests settings.
d. Local Linear Forests. The last step of our forests collection will be used in
the estimation of the nuisance parameters, ŵ (x) and ŷ (x). Whereas in Athey et al.
(2019) these quantities were estimated via regression forests, Friedberg et al. (2020)
demonstrates how to achieve better accuracy by estimating ŵ (x) and ŷ (x) using
Local Linear Forests. Local Linear Forests build on Generalized Random Forests,
and add a layer of linear regression to exploit smoothness of the outcome, and to
correct for potential misalignment between a test point and its neighborhood. It may
also aid in resolving instances of unbalanced data and noise.
2.5.3 Temporal Causal Forests
Until now, we have described the various forest types used in our estimation. We
now explain the step-by-step process of both stages of our analysis. We create a
Temporal Causal Forest for each Treatment Group, along with its respective Control
Group, for each week after the treatment p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and for each type of activity
(Sent Messages, Searches, Deleted Photos). The treatment effects of each user in the
Treatment Groups are estimated once for each user in the treatment groups, when
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this user “acts” as a treated user.
The TCF algorithm illustrates the steps (in pseudo-code) taken in each Temporal
Causal Forest:
X = is(x it >0)
Y = is(y ip >0)
W = is(i in treatment group)
Y.hat = local linear forest(X, Y)
W.hat = local linear forest(X, W)
tau.hat.stage.1 = causal forest (X, Y, W, Y.hat, W.hat)
In each Temporal Causal Forest:
1. Estimate nuisance parameters, ŷ (x) and ŵ(x) for all users, using Local Linear
Forests. We tune the parameters for both local linear forests using the built-in
tuning, which bootstrap over the available parameter space and optimally finds
the suitable scaling parameters. We construct 2K honest trees12, and make
predictions using Honest Trees as described above.
2. Given ŷ (x) and ŵ (x) from 1, build a Causal Tree on GRF, which classifies
users from the Control and Treatment groups, based on their set of features,
x = Xi. As noted earlier, in the case of Temporal Causal Forests developed
here, the set of covariates (features) used are the timeline of users (an indicator:
whether the user engaged in this activity each week) before the treatment (Xit),
along with such psycho-demographic features as age, marital status, and privacy
preference. The parameters used in creation of the trees are estimated using
the built-in tuning, so that the optimization of the parameters is carried out by
bootstrapping as described above. We use 2K honest trees.
12This is the recommended number of trees for this size dataset. Results were robust to other
specifications of relatively large number of trees.
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3. The results from running the TCF is an individual estimate of treatment effects
and variances around them. Therefore, each user in a control group has, for 3
types of activities, 3 weeks after the announcement, a measure of the change in
probability of being active, along with variances of these estimates.
Population Mean and Variance. To estimate both the mean treatment effect






be the individual estimated treatment effect and variance, respectively, as computed
by Temporal Causal Forest (removing the t subscript for conciseness). The mean





The variance around this estimation is constructed from both the uncertainty (vari-
ance) around each individual estimate (σ2τi), and the uncertainty around the mean of
all individual estimates:




σ2τi + (τ̂i − τ̄treated)
2]
N2treated
2.5.4 Sources of Heterogeneity in the Effect of the Information Shock
As indicated in the literature review, users may have varying reactions to data
breaches, owing in part to different expectations regarding website’s duty to protect
their personal information. In addition, in settings like that presented here, the data
announced as breached could well reveal an active search for an extramarital affair.
Although results stemming from this specific dataset may be of interest in itself –
due to the nature of the data breach and for the investigation of reactions to severe
privacy invasion, TCF may be used in other settings to afford clearer understanding of
possible reasons that make individuals more, or less, reactive to a variety of exogenous
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shocks.
A specific example in our data setting concerns whether married people would
be differentially affected by the breach, since they have, ceteris paribus, more to
lose compared with single ones (as a reminder, using a survey we ran on the entire
population, we verified that there is no clear bias in disclosing marital status on the
website). In such cases, possible sources of heterogeneity may be explicable by users’
willingness to be more “public” in their profile, assessed by the available indicator of
whether the user had a public photo on the website13. Those with public photo run the
risk of revealing their identity on the website even before the breach (e.g., depending
on how identifiable they are in the photo), potentially because they entrusted the
website’s security protocols.
In addition to these, in our setting, it might be possible that users in different
treatment groups that were affected by the data breach at different membership ages
will be affected by the data breach announcement in distinct ways. To locate observed
sources of heterogeneity in the response to the breach announcement, we complement
Temporal Causal Forest results with a linear regression. Specifically, for user i with
treatment effect tuple, τ̂i (i.e., for each t ∈ {post1, post2, post3} = {1, 2, 3}, after
the breach was announced), we regress the effect of the announcement for that week,
as follows:
τ̂it (Xi) = β0 + βCCohorti + βMMarriedi + βPPrivatei + εit
For ease and consistency of interpretation, all independent variables – cohort, marital
status (married / single), and an indicator for whether the user had a public photo
on his profile – are mean-centered and standardized, e.g., the intercept refers to the
“centroid case” within the data.
13The photo is public only to registered users, but it is not necessary to pay in order to register.
Therefore, theoretically any person who was interested in seeing photos of users on the website could
have joined, and seen photos of users willing to share them.
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2.6 Results
We first discuss the average treatment effect, and then possible sources of hetero-
geneity.
2.6.1 Average Treatment Effect
The average effects of the announcement of the data breach on deleted photos,
which are depicted in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.1, suggest a substantial increase: 2.8%
more of the users (which is double the baseline) deleted at least one photo immediately
after the announcement (Week 1). This seems reasonable, considering that users
tried to “cover their traces”, after realizing that their personal data were no longer
secure on the site. While hardly a remedy for their data security loss, it was at
least a protective action within their own control (one we can observe), to lower the
probability of further identification. In the following weeks, there is a significant
decrease in the probability of deleting photos, compared to before the announcement;
this suggests that whoever wanted to delete their photos did so immediately after the
announcement, and therefore had fewer photos to delete in the following weeks.
Table 2.1: Temporal Causal Forests Mean and Standard Deviation
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
Sent Messages
Mean -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.022***
SD (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Searches
Mean -0.006*** -0.039*** -0.037***
SD (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Deleted Photos
Mean 0.028*** -0.003*** -0.005***
SD (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Observations 49,993
Note: *p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001
In contrast to deletion of photos, for searches and sent messages, on average users
decrease both of these activities, for all three weeks observed after the announcement.
For searches, it seems that the effect is mainly manifested in the second and third
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Figure 2.7: Average treatment effects and 95% confidence interval of the change in
probability of being active.
week after the announcement, in terms of decrease in probability of being active (3.9%
and 3.7% decrease, respectively).
For sent messages, results suggest some attenuation (i.e., “less decrease”) in Week
3, in terms of probability of being active, compared to the week before (2.7% in week
2, vs 2.2% in week 3). This suggests the effect is waning over time, in line with Rosati
et al. (2017), who found a short-term reduction in bid-market price following a data
breach, but no long-duration effect; our three-week post-breach data window do not
allow this to be verified.
In order to assess the model fit, Table 2.1 presents the estimated counterfactual,
along with the model free evidence of TCI. The results suggest that TCF correctly
estimates the percent change in probability of being active.
Whilst in Figure 2.8 we presented the mean treatment effects, taking into con-
sideration the individual-level error and population variance, we note that there are
varying reactions to the data breach. The distributions of the individual treatment
effects (taking into consideration only the mean individual estimates) are displayed in
Figure 2.9. This illustrates the range of estimated reactions to the data breach, where
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Figure 2.8: Percent of active users per Control/Treatment group with estimates,
as resulted by Temporal Causal Inference, for the treated group (solid line) and
control group (dashed). In red: the estimated counterfactual percent of active users
as estimated by Temporal Causal Forests. The treatment effect is the difference
between the observed and counterfactual behavior of the treated group.
some users increased the likelihood of being active, others have decreased it. Under-
standing the reasons for the various reactions may assist policymakers and businesses
to tailor their messages of post-breach protective measures to populations that may
be less likely to react. Businesses who are affected by the data breach may be able
to assist their customers in protecting themselves, as well as to understand where
harm to trust was the most extreme. In the next section, we will uncover some of the
sources for this heterogeneity in reactions.
2.6.2 Observed Sources of Heterogeneity
We now aim to identify sources of heterogeneity in the treatment effect. To do
so as transparently as possible, we regress the individual treatment effects, τ̂it(Xi),
on the key input covariates, Cohort, Married, and Private (no public photo on the
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Figure 2.9: Distributions of the heterogeneity in treatment effects – mean individual
changes in the probability of being active in each activity on the website. Each panel
is for a different activity, each column is for different week following the announcement
of the data breach, and colors indicate the tail probability.
website). Note that this is fully analogous to “Level II” of a hierarchical linear model,
except the dependent variables here are the outputs of the TCF, which we seek to
explain. Because all covariates are mean-centered and standardized, the intercept
corresponds to the average estimated treatment effect, as captured by TCF, and
is similar to the population estimates presented above14 in Figure 2.7. The other
“β” coefficients capture marginal effects of deviations from the average effect of the
data breach, for those who are, respectively, “newer” on the website (joined later),
married and private (had no public photo). The coefficients of searches and messages,
presented in Figure 2.10, (along with the added common intercept that is presented
in Figure 2.11 for ease of interpretation with the average treatment effect) indicate
that newer users (higher “cohort”) were less active – that is, reduced their activities
more than users that were on the website for longer duration, in all weeks and in all
14In lieu of tabular results, which are numerous and available in Appendix 2.9.1, we present
analyses for outcomes of interest – i.e., the effects of the breach and covariates associated with them
– visually via mean effects and associated (95%) confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.10: Sources of heterogeneity – coefficients and 95% CIs for sources of treat-
ment effect heterogeneity, for each type of activity. Intercept (constant) is added in
Figure 9, for ease of interpretation of relative change in activities.
activities. This might be due to “floor effect” – they had more activities to reduce,
due to their younger age on the website. For searches and messages, results also
suggest that married people reduced more of their messages and searches, compared
to single users on the website. In contrast to married users, users who chose to be
more private on the website (had no public photo), had smaller decrease (smaller
treatment effect) in terms of probability of being active in searches and messages,
than those who chose to have public photos on the website.
For deleted photos, married users deleted more photos immediately after the an-
nouncement, while private users deleted fewer photos than public users. This might
be due to the fact that private users did not understand that being relatively private
on a hacked website (by only allowing reciprocal sharing of photos) does not neces-
sarily mean they are protected from other users who might join the website, or from
the data breach itself. Being private did not mean they were protected from a data
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Figure 2.11: Sources of heterogeneity with main effects – coefficients added to inter-
cept of all DVs (panels) for each week following the data breach.
breach, and in fact, the hackers announced to have hacked the photos as well15. This
might be an example of a false sense of privacy, where ironically, those who cared most
about their privacy and changed their settings to not have public photos available to
all, were also the least, and last, to protect their privacy in what can be seen as the
only way they could have.
2.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we describe several robustness checks and placebo tests run to
assess the “Temporal Causal Inference assumptions” invoked, as well as the validity
of the various Causal Inference methods whose results have been presented.
15Even though we cannot determine exactly how many photos a user had at the time of breach,
prior deletion is a reasonably good indicator of how many photos there are. Therefore, since past
behavior (Xit) was used in the estimation of the treatment effect, we presumably control for the
number of photos via proxy information available in the data set.
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2.7.1 Diff-in-Diff Model
We tested our main results with a “differences in differences” model, as in Janaki-
raman et al. (2018) and numerous prior studies:
yit = µi + βaPit + βeffectTri · Pit + βAAit + βA2A2it + εit,
where yit is an indicator of whether user i made any such activity at time t or not. µi
is the individual fixed effect for user i. Pit is equal to 1 if the period t is post-treatment
(or lack of treatment, for the control group) for user i, 0 otherwise. Tri equals 1 if
user i is in the treatment group, 0 otherwise. Ait and A
2
it are the membership age of
user i at time t, and its square term, to allow for potentially diminishing marginal
effect of membership age, as we see in the model-free illustration. εit denote error
terms, with the usual assumption of being zero-mean Gaussian across users.
Note that adding fixed effects eliminates the need for the treatment indicator Tri
, since it is user-specific and therefore correlates perfectly with the individual fixed
effects. In order to balance the number of observations for each membership age,
the data are restricted to the 8-week window prior to the treatment. Note that this
reduction still allows us to gather insights on the full trajectory, since different users
are in different membership age categories at the time of the treatment. [All reported
results are robust to using the full timeline of all users, which by construction varies
between cohorts.]
Since we observe 3 weeks after the treatment (announcement of the data breach)
and since we do not want to assume consistent effects for these weeks, we repeat
this analysis three times; specifically, for each week after the treatment, we eliminate
other weeks’ data. Results of the mean effect on the percent change in number of
activities, and of the heterogeneity in users’ response, are reported in Appendix 2.9.2.
Results were similar to the results of Temporal Causal Forests. However, there were
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some differences between TCF and DID in the magnitude of the changes. We stress
that TCF, with its flexibility and nonparametric nature, is more accurate than DID.
As mentioned earlier, we verify this claim in a series of simulation studies as will be
described in Section 2.7.5, where TCF was found to be more accurate.
2.7.2 Generalized Synthetic Control Group
As pointed out by Xu (2017), a major diff-in-diff assumption is that, in the ab-
sence of treatment, the mean outcomes of the control group and treatment group
would follow “parallel paths”. Though TCF should overcome this by looking for par-
allel trends across the entire population, and nonparametrically match users in this
manner, it is nonetheless important to verify that the main substantive findings are
robust. Therefore, we also ran the Generalized Synthetic Control Group (Gsynth)
method (Xu, 2017), as a robustness check to Temporal Causal Forests. This method
affords several advantages, e.g., it can incorporate multiple time periods following the
treatment, allows for heterogeneous effects, and relaxes the assumption of parallel
trends between the control group and treatment group by constructing a “synthetic
control group” (i.e., a linear combination of trends of multiple users). However, due
to computational intensity, all analyses were conducted at the cohort-level, thus al-
lowing for analyses of average effects, and not heterogeneity in effects. We conducted
a model selection exercise, choosing among several specifications (adding covariates
or not), and among two estimation procedures - either Matrix Completion (MC, as
presented in Athey et al. (2021)) or Interactive Fixed Effects (IFE, as presented in
Bai (2009)), and present the best-fitting model in terms of goodness of fit in the
pre-treatment periods. The model estimated with Matrix Completion is of the form:
yjt = βaPjt + βeffectTrj · Pjt + µj + εjt,
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where yjt is the percentage of active users in cohort j at time t. An indicator
variable Pjt is equal to 1 if the period t is post-treatment (or lack of treatment, for
the control group) for cohort j, 0 otherwise. A treatment indicator variable Trj equals
1 if cohort j is in the treatment group, 0 otherwise. µj is the fixed effect for cohort
j and εit denote error terms, with the usual assumption of being zero-mean Gaussian
across cohorts. Results are reported in Section 2.7.3.
2.7.3 Bayesian Synthetic Control Method
In addition to Gsynth, we avail of another recently-developed Synthetic Control
Method, one from the Bayesian perspective, the “Bayesian Synthetic Control Method
(BSCM) (Kim et al., 2020), estimated with a horseshoe prior.
To illustrate the robustness of the results, counterfactuals estimated using both
Gsynth and BSCM are presented alongside those of Temporal Causal Forests – remov-
ing the average treatment effect on the treated, βeffect from the observed behavior of
the treated group formed with TCI. Results were found to be robust and comparable
to our presented TCF results, for all types of activities, for all weeks after the breach.
Since Generalized Synthetic Control Group requires at least 6 weeks prior to the
treatment, the results of all three methods include only the cohorts that were at least
6 weeks on the website prior to the treatment, even though in the rest of the paper,
when using TCF as the chosen method, we use all estimated cohorts. Interestingly,
when looking at Deleted Photos in weeks 2 and 3 after the treatment, the average
Control group is slightly increasing the number of deleted photos, relative to what
would otherwise have been a downward slope. We do not know of such a reason, but
it exemplifies the need to avoid making the parallel trends assumption.
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Figure 2.12: Average percent of active users with TCF, BSCM and Gsynth: Control
(solid) and Treatment (dashed) group (average across cohorts in each group), three
weeks prior and post treatment, alongside the estimated counterfactual number of
activities for the control group – estimated either with Bayesian Synthetic Control
Method (BCSM, in red) or Generalized Synthetic Congrol Group (Gsynth, in green)
or with our proposed chosen method, Local Linear Causal Forests (LLCF, in blue).
2.7.4 Falsification Test: Placebo Test
Possible concerns with Diff-in-Diff methods are explicated by Bertrand et al.
(2004). First, as they note, “Obviously, DD estimation also has its limitations. It is
appropriate when the interventions are as good as random, conditional on time and
group fixed effect.” (Bertrand et al. (2004), pp 250). In the example of an exoge-
nous shock such as the one presented here, the intervention is ‘randomly assigned’
for the simple and tautological reason that all users were affected. However, a pos-
sible concern might be that users join the website at different times for reasons that
are relevant to the effects of the treatment and are not explained by covariates. In
other words, the assignment to cohorts, which is defined as the time of joining the
website, might be confounded with the effects of the data breach. Although there is
no apparent reason why this might be so, even if there is such confounding effect,
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our construction of “Temporal Causal Inference” offers a possible remedy for such a
problem: since almost all cohorts are used both as treatment cohorts and as control
cohorts for various time periods, whatever possible differences exist will be eliminated
or attenuated (at least relative to non-matched reduced-form models). Another as-
sumption that should be tested is the “parallel trend” that underlies the Diff-in-Diff
methodology, as explained earlier. It is impossible to test this directly, and therefore
we used gsynth and TCF to account for that. In order to further validate this as-
sumption, we ran several Placebo tests, for several weeks prior to the announcement
of the data breach. Specifically, we recreated the control and treatment groups via
Temporal Causal Inference, with fake “treatments” (i.e., times where no data breach
occurred) 3, 4, or 5 weeks prior to the data breach, and reran Temporal Causal
Forests with these datasets, on all three types of activities. The analyses showed
mainly nonsignificant effects of the treatment, as expected16. Due to the nature of
these analyses, it allowed us to make further use of the placebo settings in simulation
study, as we describe next.
2.7.5 Simulation Studies
In order to assure that our chosen method is able to recover the treatment effects
even in cases of noise and heterogeneity in treatment, we ran two types of simulation
studies, as follow:
2.7.5.1 Synthetic Simulation
The first was purely synthetic, and included data generated using a Diff-in-Diff
model, with pre-specified error around the covariates and around the treatment effect.
We modeled the log number of activities as dependent variable in all synthetic simula-
16In “deleted photos”, we saw small, significant, increases in number of activities in weeks 2 and
3 following the “fake treatment”. In these cases, the effect was opposite to that of the data breach.
This might indicate that we underestimate the effect of the breach.
53
tions, in order to not have sensitivity to generation of linear probability model with a
binary data simulation. We compared both (1) Causal Forests (CF), (2) CF with the
Local Linear Correction (Temporal Causal Forests) and (3) the model that generated
the data, Diff-in-Diff. Due to the improvement of TCF over CF, we show only TCF
in the below plot. Somewhat surprisingly, although DID was the data-generating
process, TCF recovers the effects almost as well as DID, in all pre-specified settings
(Figure 10, left panel). Moreover, when the individual treatment was correlated with
the individual treatment effect, via modeling it to be τi ∼ N(µi, στ ), where µi is the
individual fixed effect, Temporal Causal Forests outperformed DID, in all pre-defined
and reasonable variance settings.
Figure 2.13: Results of simulation studies: RMSE of Diff in Diff (pink) and Temporal
Causal Forests (purple) as a function of treatment heterogeneity and error variance.
Left panel shows a fit to a simple linear model that generated the data. Right panel
shows the fit of a model where the treatment effect is correlated with the individ-
ual fixed effects. While in the simple model TCF is able to recover the treatment
effect almost as well as DID, in the non-linear model TCF outperforms it (i.e., has
lower RMSE) and is able to recover the treatment effect far better for all pre-defined
settings.
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2.7.5.2 Placebo-based (Real Data) Simulation
Due to the nature of the dataset, we wanted to verify that, even with the noise
and heterogeneity in activities on the website, we are able to recover a pre-defined
treatment effect. In order to do so, we used the placebo setting (pretending the
announcement happened before it actually did). In particular, we took placebo of 5
weeks prior to the data breach, then created fake treatment effects of various means
and variances. Temporal Causal Inference was able to recover the effects accurately.
Taken together, the robustness checks, placebo analyses, and simulation studies
(either fully simulated or placebo-based) suggest that the standard TCI assumptions
hold, and that the chosen method – TCF – is able to recover treatment effects both
in synthetic data and our real data.
2.8 Conclusion and Future Directions
The increase in frequency and severity of data breaches calls for research along
several interrelated lines, including prevention, detection, assessment, and post hoc
remediation. The consequences of data breaches are more than merely financial; they
pose individual risk, privacy violations, and loss of trust. In order to help mitigate and
assess the consequences, it is critical to understand the range of reactions that data
breaches engender. Notification laws were put in place to reduce the risk of financial
loss due to such invasions, especially so identity theft. While much research has
focused on measuring the effects of exogenous shocks on public companies whose data
are widely available, surprisingly little is known regarding individual-level reactions
to such breaches, perhaps owing to the need for detailed trajectory data from site
users; although such data are rarely made available to researchers, firms track it as
a matter of business practice, so could readily avail of causal inference methods in
order to assess and mitigate the consequences of a data breach, offer appropriate
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compensation, and recover trust.
The construction of Temporal Causal Inference, in which the control group was
taken to be an older cohort of users, supported the key Causal Inference assump-
tions, such as un-confoundedness, which is required for measurement. Both average
and individual-level effects can be statistically teased out relative to confounds such
as typical reduction in number of activities, or differences due to demographic and
psychographic traits. Results strongly bear out such differences: married people had
more extreme treatment effects than single ones, and private users on the website
were less extreme in their changes in activities, than those who were more public on
the website.
We must stress that, although the method developed and applied here fully gen-
eralizes to assessing other information shocks and data breach incidents, the specific
covariate effects almost certainly do not: a great deal depends on the nature of the
shock, the individuals compromised by it, and their relationship to the focal firm; for
example, marriage is unlikely to be a key demographic implicated in reaction to a
data breach in a commercial store setting. However, given that firms typically have
a great deal of individual-level information on customer history and demographics, it
should be possible for them to paint a rich portrait of the sorts of customers who are
differentially put off by the breach itself, based on their post-breach usage behavior
and prior trends available at large. This is a critical issue in Customer Relation-
ship Management, wherein firms must fashion heterogeneous incentives across the
customer base, that is, to offer each customer specific benefits that he or she finds
valuable. It may be that, even among customers who react negatively to the breach,
some will respond to very different reparative incentives, e.g., some preferring security
services (as in the recent Equifax breach), and others financial concessions (as in the
data breach to Target; Kude et al. (2017)).
Although we are loath to offer policy implications based on this one study, the
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degree of post-breach average activity reduction was surprisingly modest, particu-
larly given the nature of the website and the media storm following the data breach.
What appears to be the case is that some users are initially upset and reduced their
activity accordingly, but, in relatively short order, we can see a hint of “life returns
to normal”. Again, whether this generalizes to other breaches is an empirical ques-
tion, but it may be that firms should attend to breaches vigorously in the short-term,
when users appear to alter their behavior most. That said, policy makers, users of
breached websites, and customers of breached stores, would do well to be far more
vigilant in the long-term, especially about undertaking actions to both protect their
personal data and incent firms they do business with to enact more stringent security
measures. Finally, for this one extreme data breach, some users suffered documented
psychological distress: self-harm, loss of livelihood, or divorce. While our method
can capture a relatively circumscribed range of data breach effects, it is important to
underscore that there are far more pernicious consequences. Offering identity protec-
tion or best-practices counseling to those at greater risk (e.g., married, sharing more















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our Data Driven Future: Promise, Perils, and
Prognoses
This essay is a joint work with Fred M. Feinberg. A previous version of this essay
has been published in:
Turjeman, Dana and Fred M. Feinberg (2020) “Our Data-Driven Fu-
ture: Promise, Perils and Prognoses”. Review of Marketing Research:
Continuing to Broaden the Marketing Concept, Vol. 17
3.1 Abstract
Nowadays, most of our activities and personal details are recorded by one entity
or another. These data are used for many applications that fundamentally enrich
our lives, such as navigation systems, social networks, search engines, and health
monitoring. On the darker side of data collection lie usages that can harm us and
threaten our sense of privacy. Marketing, as an academic field and corporate practice,
has benefited tremendously from this era of data abundance, but has concurrently
heightened the risk of associated harms. In this paper, we discuss both the great
advantages and potential harms ushered in by this era of data collection, as well as
ways to mitigate the harms while maintaining the benefits. Specifically, we propose
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and discuss classes of potential solutions: methods for collecting less data overall,
transparency of code and models, federated learning, identity management tools,
among others. Some of these solutions can be implemented now, others require a
longer horizon, but all can begin through the advocacy of Marketing Research. We
also discuss possible ways to improve on the benefits of data collection – by developing
methods to assist individuals pursue their long-term goals while advocating for privacy
in such pursuits.
3.2 Introduction
It’s a near-cliché that we live in an age of unprecedented access to data and the
decisions they enable. A customer purchasing an appliance, an employer vetting can-
didates, a suitor seeking a relationship, or a couple picking through restaurants, are
each faced with a cornucopia of options, often informed by algorithms attempting
to sort through and meaningfully prioritize them. While abundant variety may be
overwhelming at times, such algorithmic tools and communication services provide
an efficient pathway to what we seek. Compare this with the situation of even a
few decades ago, where buying something meant visiting multiple stores, or meet-
ing new people could take weeks of dedicated effort. It’s no wonder society has
never looked back, nearly universally embracing the ability to rapidly locate suitable,
locally-accessible options. What people often fail to realize is that this array of helpful
systems thrives on analyzing not only vast data from an anonymized user pool, but
also detailed information on individuals. At the time of writing, worldwide smart-
phone users have passed the 2.65B mark 1 (McNair, 2018), roughly half the world’s
over-18 population. With a smartphone, tablet, or laptop in hand, humanity’s col-
lective knowledge is just a tap away. Yet this is a two-sided process: each of those
taps leaves a detailed, time-granular data trail that collectors can mine to help users
1content-na1.emarketer.com/global-digital-users-update-2018
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succeed in their goals and plans, but can also store information the users would be
reluctant to provide if asked directly (Langheinrich and Schaub, 2018). These data
can be used for purposes unaligned with users’ desires, in some cases harming their
identity, safety, and sense of privacy. This presents a challenge for policy-makers,
firms, and customers, who must balance the undeniable advantages the data-driven
era provides with the negative aspects of the its potential downstream uses. The goal
of papers in this volume is “Given what we know about Marketing, here’s how to
improve some aspect of The World”. Our paper will present something of a cycle,
though. We, as marketers, have created and benefited from a Brave New World of
data collection. This data-driven era has advanced our society in many domains and
aspects of our daily lives. But this abundance of data has revealed a darker side:
privacy – the ability to be left alone, unknown, and to have control over one’s own
information and reflected identity and behaviors – is vanishing. Data collection on
individuals starts literally at birth with government records, and continues as pur-
chases and movements through the world and social spaces accumulate, relentlessly
preserved for future access. The tension between the advantages of digital data col-
lection and the liberty to be left unrecorded was noted as early as 50 years ago, in
Miller (1969) invocation of the “womb-to-tomb dossier”, wherein any citizen’s life
record could be instantly called up, by anyone, for any reason. Stigler (1980) and
Posner (1981), writing on the economics of privacy, forecasted the ease and value of
acquisition of information (data) and the financial benefits of transferring such data
to the highest bidder: benefits that in some cases transfer to customers, through
higher efficiency in finding whatever they sought. Yet Miller, Stigler, and Posner
could scarcely have envisioned a world where smartphones and embedded devices
notate our every move, query, and purchase. We, the Marketers, by aiming to sell
smarter, helped forge this double-edged sword: the very algorithms that aid and ease
personal decision-making can also channel our data toward less-desired objectives. In
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this article, we will present some of the undeniable advances afforded by near-costless,
disintermediated data collection, but also its darker shadows: “issues” that arose, as
well as potential threats we perhaps haven’t yet been made aware of (but could well
have already transpired). We will then review several technical, methodological, and
psychological approaches that may assist in maintaining the legitimate gains these
data entail, while reducing associated harms. Lastly, we will suggest a stream of
thought to encourage the societally and personally positive uses of data. These ap-
proaches rely on extensive research in marketing proper, as well as other literature
streams.
3.3 The Promise and Perils of Data Collection
The ability to observe people’s behavior across multiple domains in their lives
allows us to do more than merely sell them products. It allows social scientists, policy
makers, health advocates, and others to learn more about people’s behaviors, even
down to their genes, and to enhance their wellbeing – if they so desire. However, this
may also lead to unanticipated uses that are not in the best interests of the individuals
who simply ‘gave away’ their data. In this section, we will illustrate several of the key
benefits of data collection, along with their already-observed hazards, and potential
risks that may yet to have surfaced.
3.3.1 Shopping and Search Data
Marketers have long sought granular data with one overarching goal: to anticipate
potential customers’ “needs” and accommodate them with superior products, distri-
bution, and appropriate messages. Before the advent of so-called Personal Computers,
this meant collection by large firms in the form of customer surveys, TV ad tracking,
and individual store audits, which could be overlaid to achieve a rough match-up be-
tween marketing policies and eventual retail performance. All this changed due to the
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broad advent of supermarket scanners and panel data: every store purchase made by
individual households, along with methods and computational resources to process it
(Guadagni and Little, 1983). This early “big data” quite literally revolutionized the
practice of marketing, whose effectiveness could be accurately measured in something
like real-time. The intervening decades have brought two sequential innovations that
have vastly refined the granularity of this measurement: internet shopping and mobile
devices. It is possible for marketers nowadays to track, even across devices2, every el-
ement of the customer experience – ad exposures, searches, page views, clickthroughs,
shopping baskets, even brick-and-mortar visits – up through eventual purchase, pro-
viding unprecedented refinement of our ability to anticipate and meet customer needs.
The spate of purchase-directed search data allows marketers to better target each and
every one of us. It may aid us in finding things we didn’t even know we wanted, and
to ease the process of locating a good match for our desires. However, this also gener-
ated a spiraling number of unsolicited offers to purchase items that we may not want
or need (although marketers note an illuminating counterfactual: that, without such
targeting, we may receive even more such unsolicited offers, for items that suit us less
well). It may also create the feeling of being tracked, leading to negative emotions
towards the brand, product, or medium through which the ad was delivered, and may
decrease purchase intent (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Kim et al., 2019). Nissenbaum
(2009) zeroed in on this phenomenon by coining “Privacy in Context”: when data spill
over to other venues, it might violate the sense of privacy. More recently, Kim et al.
(2019), in the context of ads on websites, found that customers deem a non-acceptable
flow of information as either (1) obtained from another source, or (2) inferred by the
website, and not directly provided by the customer. As we will soon discuss, such a
non-acceptable flow may involve literal geolocation, and even further through “social




are assembled into a granular private dossier of everything we do, spanning periods
of years, and sometimes traded by companies. As detailed in recent investigations34,
ambiguous privacy policies legitimize tracking, and even trading, all users’ viewing
activities, demographic data, and even stated political and religious beliefs. This
may indeed improve advertising targeting, but might also provide latitude for other
purposes unintended – and unknowable – to users.
3.3.2 Geolocation Data
The appearance of GPS- and location-based apps have ensured we and our ob-
jects are ‘never lost’. Their popularity was quick and near-universal: two thirds of US
smartphone users use location-based apps, such as Google Maps, Waze, and iMaps,
at least once a month (Wurmser, 2018). Hailing apps, such as Uber and Lyft, now
commonly used in many countries, benefit from the ability to monitor users’ location,
matching them with a desired ride almost instantly. Location-based apps allow mar-
keters to micro-target based on one of the most telling factors – exact location – down
to the foot. Molitor et al. (2020) found, in a large-scale field experiment, that mobile
notifications pushed to shopping mall visitors led to a purchase rate lift of 110% over
control group (in the same area, with no such notification). While some argue that
such location-based targeting should be seen as a privacy invasion, users-at-large are
satisfied when more relevant ads are served up to them based on their interests and
opportunity to buy5. Despite the vast advantages of the availability and accuracy of
location data, they may be misused: publicly available location data from a jogging
app, despite being anonymized, was found to reveal US military troops in Syria6.








homes when owners vacate7. While most location data are given with at least an
implicit consent (anyone can presumably disable location detection on their smart-
phone8), some location data are collected without explicit consent (or are buried in
the privacy agreement), and cannot be turned off. For example, telecom companies
know your exact location even if your phone is switched off, however old or new it is,
as long as it has battery power (and SIM card, if applicable). Recent studies found
that half of US cell phone users could be tracked door-to-door, every day, some up to
10 thousand times per day, revealing when they were alone and vulnerable910. These
data are usually handled appropriately, but no law forces companies to not sell them
– a $20B business in 2018 alone – to others, or to use it for any purpose that suits
their business model. Such lack of transparency and control over the data that are
being collected, and who may access them, lie at the heart of the problem... but also
hint at ways to help solve it.
3.3.3 Health and Genetic Data
Recent developments in genetic sequencing have made DNA testing widely afford-
able, with test-kits routinely sold for under $100. Such affordability allows nearly
anyone to locate far-flung relatives, to verify their ethnicity, and to play a role in
major health developments. Resulting data have already helped detect genes asso-
ciated with higher risk of type-2 diabetes (Läll et al., 2017) and Parkinson’s (Nalls
et al., 2014), and has the potential to create individualized health treatments and
heal society from a malfunctioning gene or genetic disease. It has likewise helped
solve dozens of open murder and sexual assault cases around the world, by using







advances, the collection of genetic data has also led to unanticipated consequences.
For example, mistaken identifications 11 (also Foeman et al. (2015)), in which ethnic-
ity mixtures are often reported with undue accuracy and confidence, leading many
to believe they’re not who they are, until a second test proves (sometimes) other-
wise. In other cases, people that somehow left their DNA at a crime scene might
find themselves in court years later Starr (2016). In the future, insurance compa-
nies may use innocuously-collected DNA to identify potential risk of illness, charging
a higher premium to that individual, or refusing coverage completely, based solely
on a higher predicted risk, going well beyond “pre-existing conditions”. A short leap
from present technology would enable eugenics without genetic manipulation: match-
making services (further discussed below) could allow mate-seekers to prioritize one
another based on DNA markers for “desirable” traits, much as they do now on ob-
servable ones like proximity or education. Those lacking desired genes might be left
un-matched. Due to the nature of genetic data, such outcomes may affect not only
people who consent to the usage of their DNA tests, but also to any of their family
members.
3.3.4 Dating and Relationships
Through all of human history, mate-seeking was mediated by families and local
social institutions. The advent of mass transportation and print media widened the
circle of potential mates to anyone capable of responding to an ad, but was still a one-
off, effortful process. This changed forever in 1995, when the first mainstream online
dating site, Match.com, literally opened up the world as potential mates, allowing
exchange of information, targeted search, and near-instant communication12. In re-
cent years, roughly a fifth of opposite-sex couples and two-thirds of same-sex couples




mate-finding (Rosenfeld and Thomas, 2012). This is a boon not only to those seeking
mates, but to sociologists and demographers trying to understand this most critical
of life decisions (Bruch and Newman, 2018). Yet online courtships have also opened
up every phase of potential couples’ online interactions to others. Publicly viewable
online profiles can be linked forever to the participants, who may not wish co-workers,
future spouses, or children to view them, perhaps including exaggerations or outright
fabrications. The problem is compounded by the easy exchange of suggestive or even
lascivious photos that can, in the wrong hands, go viral. Outside countries with ex-
plicit legal protections for LGBT users, dating apps pose serious risks; to illustrate,
in 2015, grindr (a dating app geared towards seeking same-sex relationships) started
hiding user locations by default in several countries, including Egypt and Russia,
where non-heterosexual activity is decriminalized but often persecuted regardless13.
3.3.5 Social Networks
Social media and networks have changed the ways in which we present ourselves,
and in which we define our social connections. Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter, and
Instagram, among others, have burst into and infiltrated our lives in the past decade
and a half. These platforms have changed our lives in terms of curation of information
and knowledge, creating echo chambers and micro-consensus(es) that enable us to
see and hear only those we (and the social network) wish to. Each of these and
similar platforms may serve as a different mirror to our personality, but for many,
the image reflected can indeed paint an accurate portrait of their beliefs and desires.
This also allows us to manage our identity and show the world what we can do,
allowing hiring personnel, marketers, and recruiters a global reach and massively
improved efficiency. Personal privacy in social networks started off as non-existent
by default, and few altered the visibility of their profiles when this functionality was
13https://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/09/world/africa/egypts-gay-community-living-in-fear
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eventually enabled. Following several incidents and public attention, most social
media platforms now offer clearer privacy settings, but it was found that many users
never read privacy policies or check their personal privacy settings (Acquisti et al.,
2017). In addition, recent revelations suggest that even with stricter privacy settings,
third party companies may scrape and collate our data from social networks (Dance
et al., 2018). In the past few years, we’ve heard repeatedly about incidents related to
socially detrimental uses of such social media data, even when they were not illegally
breached. The Cambridge Analytica incident (Confessore, 2018) showed that, even
without hacking, social media data could be used in a perfectly legal attempt to
sway people’s emotions and voting behavior (Cadwalladr, 2017). This and similar
incidents, involving multiple countries and incentives, suggested that targeting certain
populations, based on their public (and sometimes) private data, can be used to
incite violence and broaden the gap between political factions (e.g., DiResta et al.
(2019); Cadwalladr (2017); Caspit (2018). As we will further discuss in Section 3.4,
consistency, transparency, and societal welfare should guide the use and curation of
such data.
3.3.6 Data Breaches
The above examples – whether they entail perils or positives of data collection
– assume that the data are held by someone who acquired them legally, and with
some form of user consent (including usage by third-parties, which is legal in most
cases). Yet data breach incidents are reported nearly daily, and many – perhaps
most – incidents remain undetected or unknown to the public. In 2017 alone, more
than 2 billion records have been reported breached (a figure reduced to “only” 1.37
billion records in 2018)14. No form of data is immune, and in fact every type of
14privacyrights.org; The measure here includes data records that were compromised due to se-
curity breaches. Possible causes are unintended disclosure, hacking or malware, and physical loss.
All compromised records were from businesses, educational institutions, government and military,
healthcare providers and nonprofit organizations. In reality, the number should be considerably
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data outlined earlier was subject to at least one announcement of a data breach15.
And this holds aside financial data and identity theft – both much-noted for decades
– which are similarly acute. In all such instances of data breaches, companies are
encouraged to inform and to help those who were affected, but federal law in the US
(and in many other countries) fails to mandate public reporting. Breached data in
the wild remain there forever; once out, little can be done to mitigate potential harm.
Worse, even when users can take post-breach protective action, most neglect to – the
so-called “privacy paradox” (Norberg et al., 2007; Athey et al., 2017) – even when
their financial records or others integral parts of their identity might be compromised
(Zou and Schaub, 2018). “I have nothing to hide” is a phrase still commonly adhered
to; yet even those innocent of wrongdoing can be negatively affected – manipulated,
impersonated, or targeted for illegal activity – by exposing their data to shadowy
actors. Moreover, even in cases where there is clearly “something to hide”, people fall
prey to the privacy paradox and to habituation to instances of data breaches: Turje-
man and Feinberg (2021) show that, even in the case of a massive, highly publicized
data breach to an extramarital affair-seeking website, some users did not change their
patterns of site activity, despite having their full identities breached.
3.4 Reducing the Perils of Data Collection
In the previous section we described the tradeoff between the positive and negative
aspects of data collection. This tradeoff is here to stay, but a variety of actions can
be taken to reduce the risks associated with the compiling of data on individuals and
larger; for many of the breaches listed, the number of records is unknown.
15Examples: Facebook, October 2018 (social and location data of 90 million users breached);
Ashley Madison, July 2015 (full profiles, names, email addresses and more of 37 million affair-
seekers breached; data made public in August); Target, December 2013 (credit card and purchase
data of 70 million customers); Anthem Data Breach February 2017 (exposed electronic protected
health information (ePHI) of nearly 79 million patients); mSpy Data Breach(es) – May 2015, and
then another issue in 2018 – both including full records of users who were monitored by the app,
including location data, private messages, and more.
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their activities. In this section, we discuss methods and tools developed in our field
and others, with an emphasis on how actors in and outside Marketing proper can take
decisive, leading steps – both short-range and longer-term – to mitigate the perils of
a data-driven society, while trying to maintain its primary benefits. Our view is that
The Perfect is the enemy of The Good: it is better to start somewhere to reduce the
potential for harm than to wait for flawless solutions that may fail to materialize. A
graphical overview of our discussion appears in Figure 3.1.
3.4.1 Privacy by Default – A Short Term Solution
In the previous section we discussed data breaches, habituation to their announce-
ment, and the privacy paradox. In addition, as shown by Acquisti et al. (2007), few
users carefully read lengthy, legalese-laden privacy agreements (a process requiring
hundreds of hours annually for anyone so inclined; McDonald and Cranor (2008)), and
are thus left unaware of the usage of their data by apps they are using (Almuhimedi
et al., 2015), and by other entities who receive or buy their data (Schneider et al.,
2017). The recently-enacted General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the Eu-
ropean Union introduced “Privacy by Default” – according to which the data of each
person are not made available to anyone except that person and the collector, unless
the former has actively asked to do so (i.e., via an opt-in basis to share the data pub-
licly or to a third-party)16. This mechanism also requires that data will be collected
only for the purposes of the disclosed and consented goals; and, once these data are
no longer needed, they should be eliminated. In such a scenario, the future will entail
less data and a higher cost of acquiring it. Fortunately, no more than a decade ago,
much research in Marketing was devoted to solving such “lack of data” problems, due
16“...by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing
are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their
processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall
ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s intervention
to an indefinite number of natural persons.” - Article 25(2), EU GDPR, “Data protection by design
and by default”
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of proposed changes, along with the corresponding stages of
data collection.
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to historical limitations in acquisition, transmission, storage, and processing. There-
fore we, as marketers, are already equipped (and can do yet more) to use the least
amount of data to connect customers with their desired products or services. For
example, data fusion methods can allow us to collect sensitive data only on subsam-
ple of the population, and extrapolate from them to others. Two examples from our
own work include Feit et al. (2010), who used a single choice made by car buyers,
complemented by prospective customers in a conjoint analysis, to project purchase
behavior for cars yet to be manufactured; Turjeman and Tian (2021) are enacting
fusion via a variational autoencoder to match an anonymous and sensitive data set
to a behavioral, potentially identifiable data set, without endangering anonymity of
either side. Schneider et al. (2017) and Schneider et al. (2018) presented Bayesian,
model-specific approaches to protect data that are shared with other parties – pri-
marily those that need to be protected due to customer or business privacy. Lee and
Anand (2020) propose that data transfer can be limited, and instead models them-
selves can be transferred, using deep learning techniques. Such methods can preserve
desired characteristics of the data without needing the data themselves to be trans-
ferred. In computer science, much research addresses data obfuscation, to eliminate
the need to save data in raw format (e.g., Bakken et al. (2004); Marino et al. (2019)).
In short, foresightful collection and sharing of data can mitigate its potential misuse,
legal and otherwise. Advances in marketing modeling can be used to minimize the
loss of predictive power that fuels the great advantages of data collection.
3.4.2 Code Transparency – A Short Term Solution
Much of the despair surrounding usage of data concerns the lack of transparency
of how they are being used, and by whom. Open-source platforms – software products
whose source code is available for all to see, comment on, and (sometimes) obtain per-
mission to change and reuse – may assure customers that there are no misalignments
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between the disclosed usage of the data and its actual usage. Obviously, it is easier
for a company to protect the usage of its proprietary code when no one sees it, but
a sustainable business concerned about customer well-being (and loyalty) can benefit
from a publicly-vetted code base. The transparency of code, and usage of open-source
platforms, has benefits beyond simply informing users about how their data are being
used, but in also improving security of the code itself. Synopsys, a software security
and analysis company found (Synoposys, 2015), in an extensive static code analysis,
that open-source code had considerably fewer defects (bugs) than commercial soft-
ware, and was improving on this measure at a comparatively quicker rate. However,
as they note, merely using open-source code is not a cure for possible security flaws
and bugs if it – and proprietary code that builds upon it – is not reliably maintained
(Mansfield-Devine, 2016). In light of the importance of such transparency, several
countries, including Canada and the United States, are prioritizing development of
governmental code as open-source software (Scott and Rung, 2016; Brison, 2018).
Overall, when “done right”, code transparency can improve both the security of our
data and our ability to see who is using them and for what purposes.
3.4.3 Model Transparency and Interpretation – A Medium-Term Solu-
tion
The advent of deep learning methods, and machine learning in general, has ushered
in predictive power and classification accuracy more rapidly than even its early enthu-
siasts could have anticipated. Relying on such methods, practitioners and researchers
alike can enact predictive analyses on vast troves of data, enhance micro-targeting,
and improve search results. However, better prediction accuracy usually comes at the
cost of reduced transparency of the underlying methodology. With such “black-box”
methods, it becomes increasingly difficult to know why a method offers up a specific
prediction, which variables were critical to the process, and for what reasons. When
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these methods are deployed in innocuous settings, like predicting ad response, they
present little risk of harm. But when tasked with predicting likelihoods for illness or
recidivism among convicts, baked-in, difficult-to-detect biases might be devastating
for individuals. In a landmark case, the state of Wisconsin used a predictive algorithm
developed by a private firm – the details of which were a “trade secret” – to help set
judicial sentences; challenged because the algorithm was trained on data including
race and gender, one defendant sued, escalating the challenge to the Supreme Court,
which in declining to hear the case let the use of such algorithms and potentially bi-
ased data stand (Simmons, 2017). The potential for serious algorithm-directed error
in medicine, insurance, educational opportunity, and legal settings is obvious. More
broadly, social scientists need to understand why a prediction was made in order to
disentangle the social and psychological bases behind human decision-making. Unveil-
ing why a prediction was made, as opposed to mere predictive accuracy, is a critical
area of emphasis. Such an emphasis can help reduce bias, explain why a method
predicted what it did, and possibly uncover new social-science phenomena as well as
the causal, as opposed to purely predictive, nature of their genesis. As something
of an added bonus, knowing which variables are truly useful in prediction (vs. those
that are less so) can aid in deciding what sort of data should not be collected in the
first place. After all, collecting less data is the best way to protect them from misuse.
3.4.4 Federated Learning – A Medium/Long-Term Solution
Once data are held by anyone other than the subject, risks of privacy invasion
increase. Most advancement in prediction models (e.g., deep learning, as discussed
earlier) has required that the data be held by the collector, but this arrangement
might not be strictly necessary. With the advancement of mobile devices’ compu-
tational power, new machine learning methods can be deployed mainly in the client
side (Bonawitz et al., 2017). Google’s AI team is developing such “federated learning”
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models, where only updates to the (learning) model are sent, encrypted, to be aggre-
gated with other users’ data. Consequently, this maintains and improves the learning
of the overall model without ever needing to single out any user’s data. Federated
learning can vastly reduce amount of data transferred to and stored by firm’s servers
– most data are held only on the client’s side – thereby enhancing data protection.
Although such mechanisms are in their infancy, some already argue they might be
prone to attacks, if many “bad-actors” coordinate their attempts (Bagdasaryan et al.,
2020). Regardless, this approach provides a promising direction in reducing the quan-
tity of data available remotely, and so may increase control over the data shared with
service providers while still enjoying the predictive benefits of machine learning and
AI techniques more generally.
3.4.5 Control Over Data – A Long Term Solution
As stated earlier, most perils of data collection are due to lack of control over
who can access the data, and what are they doing with them. However, controlling
the data one gives away, sometimes inadvertently, is no simple matter. Here we
propose a somewhat buzzword-laden solution that nevertheless merits our attention:
Decentralized Ledger Technology (DLT), such as blockchain or hashgraphs, can be
used as identity management systems. DLT represents a technology for sequential,
decentralized transfer of information, where every such transfer (or transaction) is
recorded and can be both traced and verified. Despite a potentially limitless number of
agents in the system, each can create, transfer, and vote for the accuracy and validity
of a transaction. Cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, is a popular pioneering example of
a blockchain implementation, where the commodity (information) that is transferred
is a mined “coin”. However, circling back to the underlying mechanism – the mere
transfer of information – several recent developments enable identity management
using such decentralized approaches, providing a mechanism for controlling who is
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accessing which data, when, and why. Such systems have already been proposed to
assist in authentication procedures (Lin et al., 2018). Possible extensions may include
a “revoke option”, so that if an entity uses the data for a reason not consented to by
the user, she will be able to “take the data back”, by changing her public key. While
much remains to be done in terms of practical deployment, the general approach can
empower and reassure users, and is a particularly worthy topic for academic inquiry.
3.4.6 Data Protection – An Ongoing Solution
The process of protecting data is a never-ending one; every novel protection
method is good only until the next clever hacker overcomes it. At that point, further
development becomes necessary, requiring frequent security updates. Not collecting
the data is the easiest way to protect them, but this comes at a cost of losing the ben-
efits they provide to individuals and society. Some of the methods presented above
(data fusion, data obfuscation, federated learning), developed in multiple fields, in-
cluding Marketing and especially so in Computer Science, can allow us, as a society
and profession, to reduce the currently indiscriminate collection and warehousing of
data. Further data protection methods, too numerous to list, can and should then be
used to protect (or obfuscate) whatever we do deem worthy of collection.
3.5 Enhancing The Promise of Data Collection
Thus far, we’ve discussed the promise and perils of our data-driven future, and
laid out several directions to mitigate some of the latter while still benefiting from
the former. In this section, we illustrate why we, as marketers, are hopeful about the
positive impact that the data-driven era may entail for people’s lives. To a limited
extent, this is already happening, in helping us “cut through the clutter” when we
have a good idea of what we seek. For example, visitors to Amazon looking for a
“food processor” turn up nearly 1000 options; Tripadvisor lets the sushi-craver in Los
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Angeles consider 500 establishments; and someone seeking love online in any major
city will be confronted with tens of thousands of profiles, sortable by their search
preferences. These “proximate goals” – ones easily articulated and whose attainment
is verifiable – are ably mediated by recommender systems that help individuals sift
the wheat from the chaff. But most true goals in life are evolving and elusive: staying
healthy, assembling a rich social sphere, raising successful children, growing wiser.
How can information be gathered “safely” to allow individuals to refine and make
their way, in the quasi-dark, toward attaining such goals? One possibility lies in
data-driven marketing, focused on goals that are hard for us to reach or even eluci-
date (Dellaert et al., 2018). When guiding a particular individual, algorithms can call
on a vast storehouse of information on other individuals: your children aren’t the first
whose parents wished the best for them, and no one person trailblazed the search for
a life partner. As the information sphere accumulates more and more detail about the
choices individuals have already made and paths they have taken, our ability to sort
out relatively successful decisions and trajectories from less effective ones not only
grows, but allows better tailoring to individuals. Some notable successes have already
been realized in individualized medicine. For example, researchers at the Personalized
Nutrition Project (Zeevi et al., 2015) found that individual blood sugar response to
different foods is highly variable, with the same foods being benign for some and a
diabetic danger for others. A key finding was that using both generalized nutritional
data and personal microbiome features provides superior glucose response prediction.
But to benefit from such findings, individuals would have to allow information about
their own biology to be funneled to predictive models created by physicians. One such
scenario involves the sort of information systems already commonly used in Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) – a patient’s full health records available for
analysis – but where users would have control about what additional personal infor-
mation to share, as well as the power to update, curtail, or delete. While everyone
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recognizes the importance of protecting genomic and health information, marketers
are often loath to view workaday data on browsing and purchase activity through the
same lens. Yet they are enormously hampered by both consumer unwillingness to
compromise privacy and the inability to gather data on activities outside their own
records and site activity. A proverbial win-win situation could ensue if trusted part-
ners with vetted algorithms could avail of an individual user’s data stream: queries
against records that users could control, check for accuracy, limit access to, and will-
ingly enhance to improve their own goal attainment. Such a system could provide
nudges (Johnson et al., 2012), alerts, just-in-time suggestions (Nahum-Shani et al.,
2017), and – in our view, most importantly – the sort of dynamic “laddering” that
allows people to scale long-term peaks step-by-step. For example, someone recently
graduating from college may have a vague dream of one day buying a home in a
particular city, but no idea what that would entail. Such a goal can become reality
using a model based on successful (and less successful) paths taken by others. Then,
such data can be used to assist individual users, by providing them information on
the types of financial paths that lead to attainment, and the sort of periodic checks,
opportunity announcements, and granular feedback that would gently nudge them
in the right direction. It is important to realize, however, that data already in the
wild are genies permanently released from their bottles. Moving forward, data-driven
firms need an incentive to put the power of personal information back in the hands of
individual customers, and to assure them that providing voluntary access to data is
a net positive for customers and companies alike. Firms, agencies, and governments
that can avail of that data without compromising citizen trust are enabled to play
a positive role in partnering with individuals to achieve successful, healthy, fulfilled
lives. But they can go even further, and do greater good, by considering the goals
of society as a whole, and balancing them against immediate individual goals. For
example, drivers may all wish to reach a popular venue as quickly as possible, clogging
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major roadways with their shared and commonly-pursued goal of minimizing their
personal travel time; this data-driven “optimal solution” for each driver may cause
all to arrive late, relative to a coordinated one that serves some better than others.
How fairness is prioritized over “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” is an
open question, and one made more complex when governments (e.g., China’s Social
Credit – Liang et al. (2018)), firms, and malicious actors can influence what counts
as the common good. Such challenges need to be addressed by sociologists, privacy
experts, legislators and, yes, marketers, in the coming decades, as data generation
and availability continue their ever-upward spiral.
3.6 Conclusion
As we have emphasized throughout, data collection entails both perils and posi-
tives. Though we deliberately focused on examples that are relatively easy to place
in one of those two categories, other usages of data are considerably more ambiguous.
In this article, we detailed the enormous advantages of data collection, as well as
its darker shadows. We then presented several solutions that aim to reduce possible
perils of data collection, while still maintaining, and even further enhancing, its pos-
itives. In summary, marketers and technology experts alike should strive to reduce
the amount of identifiable data collected, use them in a transparent way, and protect
them, so that harm in misuse and breaches will be, if not eliminated entirely, sub-
stantially reduced. In the book “Privacy and Freedom”, public law professor Westin
(1968) defined privacy as “the claim of individuals... to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated”. We must
bear in mind that the spate of data we use every day are those of people: they are
more than consumers, customers, ID numbers, or walking-wallets. These people –
we, our families, and our friends – should have control of their “digital identity”.
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CHAPTER IV
Privacy Preserving Data Fusion
4.1 Abstract
Data fusion – the combination of multiple datasets – is a powerful technique to
make inferences that are more accurate, generalizable, and useful than those made
with any single dataset alone. However, when data fusion involves user-level data, the
technique poses a privacy hazard due to the risk of revealing the identities of users.
To preserve user anonymity while allowing for a robust and expressive data fusion
process, we propose a privacy preserving data fusion (PPDF) methodology based
on variational autoencoders (VAE), a nonparametric Bayesian generative modeling
framework estimated in adherence to differential privacy (DP) – the state-of-the-art
theory for privacy preservation. PPDF does not require the same users will appear in
both datasets when making inferences on the joint data, and explicitly accounts for
missingness in each dataset by leveraging additional variation in the other to correct
for sample selection. Moreover, PPDF is model-agnostic: it allows for inferences to be
made on the fused data, without the analyst specifying a model a priori. PPDF does
so without the original datasets ever coming in contact on a single machine or model.
We undertake a simulation to showcase the quality of our proposed methodology, and
describe a planned fusion of a large customer dataset from a match making website
with a detailed, anonymous survey.
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4.2 Introduction
Data fusion, or the linkage of multiple data sources, has been applied at leading
technology firms, including Facebook (Ryffel et al., 2018), Microsoft (Zheng, 2015)
and Google (Papernot, 2019). Data fusion can assist managers to be more informed
and more accurately explore customers’ behaviors, preferences and future needs, even
when such data are separate. For example, to learn about customer needs through the
combination of preference elicitation responses from a survey and eventual purchase
data (Feit et al., 2010), or to make more accurate projections of potential market
share, through the combination of data on both customers and the general population
(McCarthy and Oblander, 2021).
Despite the prevalence and advantages of data fusion, whenever the fused datasets
involve any form of customer-level data, the technique poses a privacy hazard of
identifying individuals. For example, Sweeney (1997) and Narayanan and Shmatikov
(2008) show that a combination of anonymized datasets with other publicly available
data can reveal individuals’ sensitive and identifiable information, in a process referred
to as “linkage attacks.” The data to be fused, even if they are anonymous or de-
identified, might be re-identified with the added data, therefore risking the privacy
of the individuals in either of the datasets subject to fusion.
To reduce the risks of identification, while allowing for the advantages of data fu-
sion, we develop a nonparametric Privacy Preserving Data Fusion approach (PPDF).
It fuses two or more datasets without the original data sources ever coming in con-
tact on a single machine or within a model, and implements differential privacy, a
state-of-the-art framework and methodology to assure privacy preservation. PPDF
allows to substantially reduce, or even eliminate, the risk of compromising customers’
privacy and anonymity.
Consider, for example, a company that runs an attitudinal survey on a set of
current customers and potential customers, with assurance of anonymity in order to
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increase survey response rate and honesty (Bradburn et al., 1979). In addition to the
responses from the survey, the company holds other data sources, such as customer
relationship management (CRM) or behavioral data. The data from different sources
can be fused with the survey data, in order to gather insights on the entire customer
population. However, this company might be reluctant to fuse data if it wants to
reduce the risk of identifying users as respondents to the survey.
As another illustration, consider two companies who seek to learn from the joint
distribution of the combination of their datasets in order to gather insights on market
share, complementary purchases, and potential avenues for growth. Each of these
companies strives to both protect their intellectual property – the data collected
being major part of it – and the privacy of its customer base.
As a final illustrative example, consider a company who wishes to split a sensitive
dataset into two or more datasets. Such separation of sensitive data can assure that
even if a data breach were to occur, the data will be separated and not as harmful
as the joint data (the harms of severe data breaches can be dramatically reduced if
names, email addresses, and other identifiers would not be stored alongside sensitive
choices, attitudinal, and other individual-level data). This company would be able
to split the data only if, when an insight on the joint data would be requested, such
insight would be possible in a secured manner, through a privacy preserving data
fusion. This can become possible using PPDF.
The goal of PPDF is to preserve customer anonymity and intellectual property,
while enabling such use-cases and others. Our method is designed to securely combine
multiple datasets to gain unified insights, reducing the risk that customers will be
uniquely identified in the fused data. We discuss how PPDF methodology may allow
companies to collect less data and to store data with fewer identifiers, potentially
even splitting datasets to separate locations, and therefore aid in protection against
privacy invasions and data breaches.
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We exemplify the use of PPDF first by simulation studies, described in Section
4.4. We then illustrate the potential of PPDF by describing a planned fusion of two
datasets from an affair-seeking website: detailed and extensive behavioral data (e.g.,
usage patterns and mate choices – all will be referred to as CRM data) on approxi-
mately one million of its customers, and a detailed, anonymous survey, answered by
a self-selected sample of approximately 5,500 of the website’s population. The sur-
vey includes questions on prior affairs, stated preferences for future affairs, marital
status, moral attitudes, vignettes on affairs and other sensitive information. As fur-
ther described in Section 4.5. The fusion of both datasets may assist us in learning
on attitudes and preferences towards affair-seeking, along with eventual choices, but
without assurance of privacy, might risk individuals. The proposed methodology will
allow us to reduce the risk that individuals’ identities will be compromised in the
process. In addition to enhanced privacy, the proposed methodology will allow us to
overcome the selection bias inherent in the self-selected sample of survey respondents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: PPDF methodology will be detailed
in Section 4.3, we’ll detail the privacy enhancement in Subsection 4.3.3.1, and will
follow this with a discussion of the types of missing data PPDF can handle, in Sub-
section 4.3.4. In Section 4.4 we show PPDF’s ability using simulation, and in Section
4.5 we illustrate the data we are planning to fuse. We conclude with a brief summary
and a discussion on further directions in Section 4.6.
4.3 PPDF Methodology
Prior work in the domain of data fusion and record linkage ranges from Dunn
(1946) – combining population data – to recent advances in combining aggregate and
disaggregate data. Record linkage and more complex forms of data fusion have been
used in multiple fields, yielding results in economics (Berry et al., 2004), geography
(Liu et al., 2020; Dias et al., 2019) and health (Dautov et al., 2019). In the marketing
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domain, it has been used to handle missing data in surveys (Bradlow and Zaslavsky,
1999), predict market share (McCarthy and Oblander, 2021), combine choice experi-
ments with CRM data (Feit et al., 2010), enrich parameter estimates and preference
predictability (Swait and Andrews, 2003), detect heavy and light users in multiple
media platforms (Feit et al., 2013), and to estimate product purchasing and media-
watching (Gilula et al., 2006).
Our method, similarly to other data fusion methodologies in marketing, is in-
tended to enhance user- and customer- level data by fusing them with other datasets.
However, much prior work in this area have focused on fusing detailed individual
(disaggregate) data with aggregate data (Feit et al., 2013; McCarthy and Oblander,
2021). For such aggregate-disaggregate uses, privacy is less of a concern because
linkage attacks are not likely, if at all possible, to occur. This is mostly because the
aggregate data cannot usually shed light on identities of the people who are in the
disaggregate data. PPDF, on the other hand, can fuse data from different sources
while protecting individuals’ privacy.
PPDF methodology does not require that the same customers appear in both
datasets to make inferences on the joint data. Fusion occurs based on the joint distri-
bution of the shared and unique variables, and therefore, under standard assumptions
of missingness in the data, to be further described in section 4.3.4, it recovers one
dataset’s missingness from additional variation made available from the other dataset.
Distinguished from prior approaches, the selection bias need not be specified in the
model (evidently, there isn’t an underlying model specified in the first place). Instead,
PPDF recovers the missingness in a nonparametric manner, inspired by advances in
Bayesian canonical correlation analysis (Klami et al., 2013; Chandar et al., 2016)
and treats each dataset as if it were a random sample from a multivariate random
distribution we wish to encode and fuse. Therefore, the marketer or manager who
wishes to learn from a survey jointly with CRM data, or from other datasets that
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inherently entail sample selection or other missingness, have more opportunity to do
so. More importantly, contrary to prior work on data fusion in marketing, PPDF is
model-agnostic; that is, it allows for inferences to be made on the fused data, without
the analyst needing to specify the model/analysis before fusion.
PPDF methodology also extends the growing stream of privacy preserving method-
ologies, such as privacy preserving data publication and synthesis (Fung et al., 2010;
Takagi et al., 2020; Evans et al., 2020; Ping et al., 2017). Our method builds on dif-
ferential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006b), further explained in Subsection 4.3.3.1.
DP allows for a pre-specified and context-specific “privacy budget” that can be tuned
to the desired risk assessment and tolerated accuracy (or utility) reduction.
Foundational to any data fusion method is the existence of shared common vari-
ables. In our illustration dataset, these are common variables such as marital status,
gender, and age. Extant data fusion methods usually start with such common vari-
ables when matching customers across datasets. However, although matching over
shared demographic variables is a natural first step, a well-known result from mar-
keting research is that matching over latent constructs of customer behavior (e.g.,
preferences, values, and attitudes) elicit improved downstream inferences and predic-
tive accuracy of customers’ needs and desires (see, e.g., Feit et al., 2010). On the
other hand, such robust matching on common and latent variables might compromise
customers’ identity (within either dataset) and reveal one’s preferences or values along
with their identifiable information. This has been illustrated by Sweeney (1997), who
relied on demographic data to reveal sensitive health information of public officials
in the State of Massachusetts, and by Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008), who relied
on inferred preferences when matching de-identified data from Netflix, along with
publicly available data from IMDb. The proposed PPDF methodology allows us to
learn the joint distribution of both datasets, based on their latent constructs, without
compromising anonymity of any user.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of PPDF of two datasets, each with common variables X ′.
Dataset 1 has variables X(1) and Dataset 2 has variables X(2). Encoders qφ(1) and
qφ(2) encode the common and unique variables of datasets 1 and 2, respectively, into
Z. Decoders pθ decode the common latent variables into the inferred variables X̃
(1)
and X̃(2), each based on the population of the respective dataset.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the two datasets1: Database 1, which is comprised of set of
variables X(1) (e.g., a CRM database including number and type of user engagements,
membership duration on the website, contract status, etc.) and common (shared)
variables X ′ (e.g., age, marital status, ethnicity, gender, etc.); and Database 2, which
also includes the common variablesX ′, but hasX(2) as its unique variables (e.g., moral
attitudes, vignettes on affair-seeking, stated preference for type of affair sought).
Importantly, while X ′ are common variables in that they have similar structure, they
might not be of the same users. In fact, the two instances of those shared variables
(X ′ in dataset 1 and X ′ of dataset 2) might not be drawn from the same distribution
– for example, if older people are more likely to respond to a survey – as long as there
is sufficient ability to recover the joint distribution. We detail our ability to overcome
1In what follows, and for ease of notation, we assume two datasets are to be fused, though this
can be generalized into more than two.
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selection bias in section 4.3.4.
Given our illustration datasets, or any other data fusion exercise of two (or more)
datasets, our goal is to infer their joint distribution (i.e., fused data distribution)
while reducing the privacy risks associated with such linkage of datasets. In our
exemplary context, we wish to find how the attributes from the CRM database (X(1))
covary with the response outcomes from the anonymous customer survey (X(2)) and
explicitly aim to avoid any one-to-one ‘match’ between the two datasets. To achieve
this, PPDF learns a set of latent representations from the shared and unique variables
of both datasets, encodes the them, and transfers them into the same latent, shared
space, Z. The quality of Z’s encoding is evaluated by its ability to decode the latent
representation Z back to the original datasets.
Note that the encoding is merely a representation of the joint distribution, does
not include the raw data, which might be identifiable, and is differentially private,
as will be explained in Subsection 4.3.3.1. Moreover, privacy is preserved since the
encoder and decoder, along with the raw datasets, can be on different servers. The
encoding and the differential privacy mechanism assure that only differentially private
latent representations of the data, and not raw data, are transferred to the common
server.
Once the encoder and decoder are optimized (by minimizing the information loss,
as will be further described in Subsection 4.3.1), a query based on any subset of
variables can be made onto the joint distribution of the remaining variables across
both datasets, which is the primary objective of data fusion.
In the following subsections, we will explain the building blocks of PPDF – starting
from a single dataset’s encoder and decoder implemented with a variational autoen-
coder (VAE), improving it through normalizing flow, making it differentially private,
and then building the bidirectional transfer learning (BTL) to fuse the datasets.
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4.3.1 Variational Autoencoders (VAEs)
Figure 4.2: Illustration of Variational Autoencoder of a single dataset (without loss
of generality, Dataset 1).
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) have been used widely to capture the generative
process of images and other data types. In this subsection, we’ll describe the varia-
tional autoencoders included in PPDF. PPDF comprises of two VAEs, one for dataset
1, the other for dataset 2, that are identical in architecture. Figure 4.2 illustrates a
single VAE. For notational simplicity, in this subsection the superscript indicating
specific datasets will be suppressed.
A VAE is a self-supervised model that learns the generative model of a given
dataset. It comprises two components:
1. An encoder (also known as an inference, or recognition, model) that takes the
dataset x and estimates a set of latent representations qφ(z|x), with inference
parameters φ that capture the data generating process.
2. A decoder (also known as amortized inference, or generative model), takes z
and estimates a model pθ(x|z) used to reconstruct the original data with set of
parameters θ, into x̃.
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The difference between the original data x and the reconstructed data x̃ forms the
objective we wish to minimize. Through minimizing this difference, the decoder and
encoder can self-supervise the learning of the dataset’s latent representation z and
the accuracy of the reconstructed data x̃.
Let pθ(z|x) be the posterior/decoded latent parameters z conditional on data x,
and let pθ(x) be the marginal likelihood, such that
x ∼ pθ(x) (4.1)




Where pθ(x, z) denotes a deep latent variable model whose prior distributions are flex-
ibly and nonparametrically formed by normalizing flow (more on that in Subsection
4.5). We optimize the variational parameters φ such that:
qφ(z|x) ≈ pθ(z|x) (4.3)
The optimization is done with a loss function, which is derived from the log-
likelihood of the data (Kingma and Welling, 2019):





































We want to maximize the log-likelihood of observing the data. From Equation
4.4, we derived two terms:
1. A latent loss, in the form of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence DKL between
the approximate posterior qφ(z|x) and the actual posterior pθ(z|x). The KL
Divergence is non-negative,
DKL(qφ(z|x) ‖ pθ(z|x)) ≥ 0, (4.5)
and in standard VAEs parameterized to be “close to” the Normal distribution
N(0, 1) in order to keep the divergence suitably small. However, this approxima-
tion to N(0, 1) severely limits the expressiveness of the encoding, and therefore
we alleviate this restriction via normalizing flows in Section 4.3.1.2.
2. The variational lower bound, or evidence lower bound (ELBO) Lθ,φ(x). Its name
derived from the fact that, due to the non-negativity of the KL Divergence, the
ELBO acts as a lower bound on the log-likelihood of the data:
Lθ,φ(x) = log pθ(x)−DKL(qφ(z|x) ‖ pθ(z|x))
≤ log pθ(x)
(4.6)
4.3.1.1 Optimizing Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO)
Re-organizing equation 4.4 shows that maximizing the ELBO will optimize two
measures of interest:
1. Maximize the marginal log-likelihood of pθ(x);
2. Minimize the KL Divergence, therefore the encoded approximation qφ(z|x) be-
comes closer to the true posterior pθ(z|x).
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Maximizing the ELBO (or minimizing −Lθ,φ(x)) will therefore be the objective
function with which each of VAEs will be constructed. In practice, this is done by
implementing mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimization. The data
are split into mini batches of random samples from the original dataset. In each
step, the algorithm computes the reconstruction loss on mini-batch B = {x1, ...xN},




x∈B∇θ,φLθ,φ(x). Then θ and φ are updated
following the gradient direction −gB. This will allow the model to get closer to the
local minimum of Lθ,φ(x), thus optimizing the VAE. It is in the SGD that differential
privacy will be implemented. However, we first describe the rest of the data fusion
process – improvement of VAE using normalizing flows, and the fusion process in the
bidirectional transfer-learning phase.
4.3.1.2 Normalizing Flows
One challenge of fitting VAEs is that they are limited in their ability to capture
the data generating process. Specifically, VAEs perform encoding using a univariate
Normal prior, N(0, 1), due to the construction of the loss function (specifically, due
to Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence DKL).
Figure 4.3: Illustration of Normalizing Flow – series of bijective functions z = fK ◦
... ◦ f2 ◦ f1(z0) allows to flexibly represent the data.
To overcome this challenge, we allow the encoder of each dataset to be flexibly
formed using a normalizing flow architecture. Normalizing flow (Rezende and Mo-
hamed, 2015; Papamakarios et al., 2019) is a Bayesian deep learning technique that
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learns high-dimensional distributions of arbitrary complexity and expressiveness, by
undertaking a sequence of non-linear, bijective (volume-preserving) transformations
of simpler baseline distributions.
Figure 4.4: Illustration of a single VAE with Normalizing Flow.
Figure 4.3 illustrates a normalizing flow2, whereas Figure 4.4 illustrates where
normalizing flow will be incorporated: instead of having a simplified latent encoding,
distributed z ∼ N(0, 1), we add in an intermediate series of bijective functions and a
latent parameter z0 ∼ N(0, 1), such that
z = fK ◦ ... ◦ f2 ◦ f1(z0). (4.7)
This allows the resultant latent parameters z to flexibly capture data relationships
of greater complexity. In turn, this enables our encoder and decoder to represent the
joint distribution more accurately in the data fusion process.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the improvement of the reconstruction of sample of digits,
using normalizing flow. VAEs (Vanilla VAE in this case; Kingma and Welling, 2019)
are known to create blurry images (Rezende and Viola, 2018), due to the limitation
2Illustration in Figure 4.3 is inspired by Lilian Weng: https://lilianweng.github.io/lil-log/2018/
10/13/flow-based-deep-generative-models.html.
93
Figure 4.5: Results of VAE with and without Normalizing Flow: results of VAE
(middle column) and VAE with Normalizing Flow (VAE + NF, right column). VAE
creates a blurry image, whereas VAE with NF is much clearer.
described in Subsection 4.3.1. The use of a normalizing flow (in this case K = 7
functions) allows a richer underlying regularization distribution, and results in much
clearer images, that capture the original digits well.
4.3.2 Bidirectional Transfer Learning
In the previous subsections, we discussed the creation of VAEs. In PPDF, we
create a single VAE for each dataset we fuse. This explanation omitted an important
part of the process: the data fusion itself. If each dataset is encoded, where does “the
magic of data fusion” occur? In this subsection, we explain the process of bidirectional
transfer learning (BTL).
Based on the conceptual framework of Bayesian canonical correlation analysis
(BCCA), we’re treating each dataset as a multivariate random variable with unknown
parameters. The encoders – with the flexibility of normalizing flow – are encoding
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Figure 4.6: Detailed architecture of PPDF – two VAEs and each with its own nor-
malizing flow.
each dataset into latent representations. This representation is of both the common
and unique variables of each dataset. The common variables will allow us to construct
the mapping between the two datasets in a formation of a joint latent representation.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the full PPDF architecture.
Consider Z1 and Z2, the latent representation of datasets 1 and 2 respectively,
encoded using parameters θ(1) and θ(2). They iteratively go through a bidirectional
transfer learning, such that Z is constructed using both datasets. The training is
optimized based on three losses:
1. Minimize the self reconstruction error (through maximizing the ELBO, see Sub-
section 4.3.1.1). This will minimize the difference between the inferred (de-
coded) data and the original data.
2. Minimize the cross-reconstruction error. I.e., minimize the error of reconstruct-
ing dataset 1 from dataset 2, and vice versa, through the usage of the common
variables.
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3. Maximize the correlation between the latent representations Z1 and Z2.
Using the augmented variational parameters, data fusion (i.e., cross-reconstruction)
can then occur as probabilistic imputations from a joint posterior predictive distribu-
tion. In other words, by garnering the posteriors pθ(1)(X
(1), X ′|Z) and pθ(2)(X(2), X ′|Z)
- where Z are the common latent representations, X(m) are the dataset-specific vari-
ables, and X ′ are the shared variables - we can obtain the posterior predictive joint
distribution, f(X(1), X(2), X ′).
Equipped with f(X(1), X(2), Z), the end result of this data fusion is that, for every
entry in either dataset, we have a probabilistic reconstruction of the matching entry











As another conceptual illustration, our combination of VAE and BTL can be
thought of as a ‘game of charades’ between two agents (i.e., a federation of models)
who must recreate the information held by the other through iteratively providing
one another with a set of ‘clues’ from the original raw data. As a rough illustration of
a single pass of the VAE for our context, first, the encoder agent encrypts the set of
unshared, or unique, attributes from one dataset into a set of latent variables. These
are then passed to the decoder model, alongside the shared common attributes (e.g.,
demographics, usage metrics) that the unshared attributes were originally indexed to,
which serve as the ‘clues’. The decoder, with learning reinforcement from the encoder,
then engages in two objectives: to decipher and reconstruct the encoder’s abstract
latent variables into their original format, and to learn the relationship between the
reconstructed unshared attributes and their associated shared common attributes.
For the first task, the decoder iteratively provides reconstruction guesses, as the
encoder’s role is to confirm their degrees of accuracy. If the guesses enter into a
tolerable range of accuracy, the decoder imputes the joint distribution of the shared
common attributes to: (1) reconstructed attributes from the encoder’s dataset, e.g.,
the anonymous survey, and (2) unshared attributes of its “own dataset”, e.g., the
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customer database. What this begets then is that when given a set of shared attributes
– such as a set of customer segmentation variables-of-interest – the decoder now
possesses the ability to generate the associated values from both the survey and
database, and thus, complete the fusion.
Using the combination of these approaches, our framework is capable of fusing
two datasets into a single joint outcome. Importantly, it does so without the original
datasets ever coming into contact on a single machine or within a model, thereby
reducing the risk of compromising customers’ privacy and anonymity. In the next
subsection, we’ll plot differential privacy ability within the process.
4.3.3 Privacy Preservation Measures and Controls
One of the essential parts of the proposed methodology is the ability to preserve
privacy. There is an inherent tension between privacy and accuracy, when it comes
to fusing datasets. The best data fusion will match each user’s variables in a dataset
to the same user’s variables in the other dataset. However, such unique identification
might reveal the user’s full set of attributes, and in some cases will allow the researcher
to uniquely identify them along with traits they did not choose to disclose, or that
can potentially hurt them. This risk is known as a “Linkage attack,” and has been
demonstrated in Sweeney (1997) and in Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008).
On the other side of the privacy-accuracy trade-off, a completely private data
fusion might take merely the summary statistics of the variables of the entire popu-
lation in one dataset, and correlate those with that of the other dataset. This will
allow learning the joint distribution on the entire population, but will not allow for
heterogeneity and covariance across datasets.
Consider the behavioral CRM dataset from an affair-seeking website, along with
detailed, anonymous survey responses on attitudes, past behaviors and demographics.
Any identification that will result from the data fusion might harm individuals in the
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datasets, who may have wished to stay anonymous and not reveal their attitudes or
behaviors. Therefore, in such cases, the data holders may choose to prefer privacy
over accuracy. As another illustrative example, less privacy might be deemed nec-
essary when handling datasets from public sources, since it is reasonable to assume
that individuals in such datasets are not expecting privacy guarantees, by the mere
presence of their data in a public dataset3.
Therefore, it is up to the data holders to assure they’re in line with customers’
expectations, regulations, privacy policies and known risks, when using the proposed
methodology, or indeed any data fusion method. The sensitivity of the data, along
with the sensitivity of the usage of the fused data, should guide in deciding on the
level of privacy guarantees.
As part of the proposed privacy preserving methodology, we offer tuning mech-
anism that will enable the data holder(s) a higher sense of control over the level of
privacy vs. accuracy. This tuning mechanism is achieved using differential privacy.
4.3.3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy, first introduced by Dwork et al. (2006b), is a mechanism used
to formalize the trade-off between privacy and accuracy through the introduction of
added noise. It allows the researcher to tune the risk associated with identifying a
person from a database, and explicitly set a “privacy budget.” Differential privacy is
considered state-of-the-art among current privacy preserving methodologies, and has
been used for data publication or data release (Takagi et al., 2020; Fung et al., 2010),
including the release of data from the 2020 Census4.
Other privacy preserving methodologies, such as K-Anonymity (Sweeney, 2002)
(obscuring the data such that every person cannot be distinguished from other K− 1
3While it is reasonable to assume that privacy expectations are low, the researcher might still




people in the dataset) and L-diversity (assuring that each variable has at least L -well-
represented values) have been proposed to enable data publication and data synthesis.
While such methods may assist with relatively small number of attributes, they fail
to scale to large datasets, and might still suffer from various privacy attacks that will
reveal identities of the people represented in them (Li et al., 2007; Domingo-Ferrer
and Torra, 2008). Nevertheless, they have been found suitable for multiple uses,
most notably password checkup tools such as “Have I been Pawned” And Google’s
security checkup (Li et al., 2019). We rely on differential privacy due to it’s ability to
withhold to richer datasets and due to the mathematical guarantees and clear tuning
parameters it enables.
Differential privacy relies on the assumption that if it is impossible to ascertain
that any particular user’s data were used in an analysis, their privacy is preserved.
From another angle, with a differentially private algorithm, each individual in any
given dataset has a bounded probability to be revealed as included in the dataset,
relative to another dataset that only differs in the removal of their data. Differential
privacy therefore relates to the to assurance (up to a bounded probability), that for
the inclusion of an individual in a dataset would not change the outcomes relative to
a dataset that does not include their data.
We first begin by defining ε-differential privacy. Consider two adjacent datasets,
D and D′, that are the same except that dataset D′ has one more observation, i.e.,
D′ = D ∪ xi where xi are the data of individual i.
An algorithm M is considered ε-differentially private (ε ∈ R and small as desired),
if for every output S, we receive the same output S with the other dataset D′ at a
probability that is at most eε that of dataset D. A low ε means that for the two
datasets that differ only in the existence of xi’s data, we have very low probability
of distinguishing any given output. This makes inclusion of xi in the data to be very
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hard to detect:
Pr (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε · Pr (M(D′) ∈ S) (4.8)
This can also be seen as: person i cannot be revealed as a respondent to a survey,
if they haven’t responded to it. The probability of being identified as a respondent,
through a variation in the outputs, would be very low in such case. A differentially
private dataset would allow us to state that even if i is a respondent to the survey, the
probability of them being identified as a respondent is very low as well; it is at most
eε more likely. ε is therefore a measure of the “Privacy Loss”, and, by construction,
smaller values of ε would lead to lower privacy loss.
As another variation of differential privacy, Dwork et al. (2006a) added an upper
bound of the individual risk δ, such that:
Pr (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε · Pr (M(D′) ∈ S) + δ (4.9)
The addition of δ acts as a “failure probability”, and should preferably be set such
that δ < 1|D| . This failure probability acts as a tolerance to the risk associated with
identification: allowing for the possibility that ε-differential privacy is broken with
probability δ.
We implement (ε, δ)-differential privacy, in the variational encoder of PPDF.
In particular, we follow Abadi et al. (2016) and implement a differentially private
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) estimation of the VAE.
At each step of the training of the VAE, we compute the gradient of the Loss
function g(x) = ∇θ,φLθ,φ(x), or, for a random subset of samples (mini-batch) B =
{x1, ..., xN}, compute the gradient of the mini-batch: gt(xi) = 1|B|
∑N
i=1∇θ,φLθ,φ(xi).
The parameters are then updated following the gradient with learning rate ηt, such
that the updating of parameters θ, φ is {θ, φ}t+1 = {θ, φ}t−ηt ·gt. This is a procedure
common for every VAE, but DP-SGD adds two more steps in the computation of the
100
gradient, to assure privacy.
1. Clipping the norm of each gradient gt, in order to assure that the information



















The parameters for the clipping of the norm and for the added noise are computed
based on the desired ε and δ, in a process referred to as “privacy accounting”, detailed
in Abadi et al. (2016).
4.3.4 Handling Missing Data and Selection Bias
Inherently, every data fusion task is intended to impute missing values: the re-
searcher is imputing the unique variables from one dataset into the other, relying on
the common variables in both.
In addition to such missing variables, in almost all realistic datasets, there is a need
to overcome the problem of missing values within variables. Missing values in data is a
common problem in social science, and in particular, in marketing research. Collecting
data from human subjects is highly likely to result in missing information. This occurs
for a variety of reasons: unwillingness of users to respond to some questions (Bradburn
et al., 1979); changes in experimental design over time, which might result in missing
observations for whole variables (Graham, 2009), and flaws in data collection carried
out in field settings.
Past techniques for handling missing data involved either removing observations
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if they had even one missing variable, or completing the missing data with the ob-
served sample mean (Graham, 2009). These techniques have been shown to be both
inefficient and inaccurate. One drawback is that they reduced the sample size, thus
possibly creating a non-random sample. They could also lead to inaccurate inferences
due to the fact that using the mean of an explanatory variable can change the impact
on the explained outcome.
Two common methods are used to handle missing data in the social sciences in
general, and in marketing research in particular. The first group is Multiple Imputa-
tion methods; key examples appear in. Little and Rubin (1989) and Kamakura and
Wedel (1997). The second group of methods for handling missing data are Maximum
Likelihood methods. Such methods can be based on classical maximization of a model
likelihood, such as in Kamakura and Wedel (2000), or on stochastic simulation, such
a Bayesian estimation used in Feit et al. (2010).
Qian and Xie (2014) proposed a Bayesian approach for completing missing data
in regression covariates. A major contribution of their work is the ability to derive
the missing values and regress over all data, without the need to specify the exact
distribution for each covariate, and the relations among covariates. This technique
can handle high-dimensional missing covariate problems. However, when there is
insufficient information to recover the underlying model, and when there is insufficient
data or a too complex problem to handle, this method may not be suitable.
There can be several types of missingness that should be acknowledged and prop-
erly handled. Specifically, Rubin (1976) classifies three mechanisms of missing data:
missing at random (MAR), missing completely at random (MCAR), and missing not
at random (MNAR, also known as non-ignorable).
In the case of MAR, while some of the data are missing, the missingness can be
overcome by other observed variables. This means that the cause of missingness may
depend on other covariates that are in the data, but not on any unobserved data. A
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simple example can be responses for an income question on a survey. People might
be reluctant to fill in their income, if they feel that they have too high or too low of
an income. However, missing answers can be imputed using a combination of other
variables such as level of education, living area, age, etc. Though imputation will
probably not retrieve the true individual responses, inferences drawn on large data
samples will not be affected by the missingness.
MCAR can be considered a special case of MAR. As implied by the name, the
missingness is completely random, and does not depend on either observed or unob-
served variables. One possible example is when some of the data are corrupted due to
technical error. Another example is when some respondents simply forget to answer
certain questions in a randomly-ordered questionnaire. As a more poetic example,
consider a dataset on a piece of paper that was under surprising rain. Some obser-
vations might have been deleted in random. No worries! Since they were randomly
missing, any inferences regarding the data as a whole will be correct5, thus represent-
ing the true underlying data generating processes, with or without completing the
data.
The MNAR (also known as NR, nonrandom, or non-ignorable) missingness mech-
anism occurs when some of the values are missing and their missingness depends on
unobserved data. Therefore, some information in the missing data depends on the
missing values themselves, and cannot be fully rectified based on available informa-
tion; as such, inferences made based on such data might be biased by the missingness.
Consider our example from above regarding missing income: if people are reluctant
to respond to an income question because they are concerned about scammers, but
such concern cannot be explained by any data available to us, then the missingness is
non-random, but would revert to MAR if we could somehow account for this missing
piece of information, perhaps through a survey question about this particular concern.
5With a caveat: the standard errors are likely to become larger, since we have fewer observations
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In our method, we will allow the data to have missingness of types MAR or
MCAR. We will nonparametrically complete (augment) a latent representation of
both within-variable missingness and the obvious whole variable missingness, with
observed variables from either dataset. We define common variables as those that
appear in both datasets, and are measured on the same scale. By semi-common
variables, we refer to variables that relate to the same underlying information, but
are measured differently. For example, date of birth (DOB) vs. age group. While
DOB is a point measure, precise, and can potentially ease the process of identifying
a person, age group can be in categories of (say) five years, which makes it harder to
identify any one person, even in a relatively small samples.
Given that missingness can occur across multiple data variables, a key limitation
to conventional data imputation methods is that model complexity scales with the
number of missing values. VAEs overcome this limitation by treating missingness
as arising from a single generative model, and instead seek to encode the joint data
generating process as a nonparametric random function that may in turn then be
used to decode missing values where missingness may arise. The method allows for
data – either individual values or entire covariates – to be missing at random (MAR),
and for truncation into categories if data are semi-common.
Moreover, if data are MNAR, but the missingness can be accounted for (becoming
MAR) using the other dataset, PPDF will be able to account for it as well. Consider
a self-selected survey as our illustrated dataset. If older users were more likely to
respond to the survey for some reason, such selection might bias our imputation
of the age variable and variables that correlate with it, such as times married or
number of affairs the respondent had. With BTL, PPDF will be able to overcome
such missingness, as long as the common variables bridge the missingness. So, if
one dataset had missingness not at random, using the common variables (e.g., age)
and the other (sufficiently informative) dataset, we can potentially overcome this
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missingness, essentially making MNAR on a single dataset become MAR in the joint
dataset.
4.4 Simulation Studies
After going through the architecture of PPDF, we will now showcase its ability
to fuse datasets for which we know their underlying joint distribution. The first
simulation is based on MNIST data. Described in Deng (2012), the MNIST dataset
is frequently used to assess classification methods. It includes 60K black and white
images of numeric digits, each with 28×28 = 784 pixel. In Figure 4.5, we exemplified
the improvement of VAE+NF over VAE in the reconstruction of the digits.
To illustrate PPDF, in the next simulation, we will split each image into two –
allocating a portion of middle pixels as if they were common variables – and will then
fuse them back.
Figure 4.7 shows the reconstruction loss of the fusion of MNIST digits, with vary-
ing levels of added noise ε ∈ {0.5, 2, 8}, where smaller levels of epsilon means larger
noise added to the DP mechanism. It is clear that adding more noise dramatically
increases reconstruction loss in recovering the MNIST digits. It is also apparent that
in this simulation, the added noise also makes the training go in the wrong direction
(for example, the increase in reconstruction loss of both the training and test data,
when large noise is added, at epochs 13-15). This is due to the added noise that might
make the gradient not be sufficiently informative to approach the local minimum.
In order to highlight the role of δ and ε in varying the noise levels of the resultant
fusion, Figure 4.8 shows the reconstruction loss of the last epoch (in this experiment,
10 epochs), for varying levels of noise. In this simulation, we used MNIST data, where
each digits is comprised of 28× 28 = 784 pixels. We left 300 pixels from the center of
each digit to be the common variables for each observation, and 784−300
2
= 242 pixels
were considered unique variables for each dataset. The smallest added noise was no
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Figure 4.7: Simulation results on MNIST dataset – reconstruction loss (the loss rel-
ative to the original images) as a function of epoch – the learning iteration, pre-set
to 20 iterations. Each panel corresponds to a different level of added noise – larger
noise means smaller level of ε. Large noise in this simulation corresponds to ε = 0.5,
Medium: ε = 2, Small: ε = 8. In this simulation, δ = 10−5 and is constant. Learning
rate is η = 10−4 and common variables are the middle 150 pixels of the 784 pixels in
each digit.
noise at all (in Blue line), and acts as a reference. As we vary ε from 100 to 10 and
to 1, we are limiting the privacy budget – increasing the privacy, and adding more
noise. This results in higher levels of reconstruction loss. Similarly, as we vary δ, we
add more noise, which results in higher loss.
Following the fusion, we get the reconstructed images presented in Table 4.1:
upper row corresponds to the basic data fusion model with no added noise, and the
rest of the columns show the resultant images with the varying levels of ε and δ.
As in any data fusion, the ability to reconstruct depends on the number of common
variables. This is usually a given, but if company wishes to split a dataset in order
to protect its customers, it can potentially control the number of common variables
before splitting. Figure 4.9 show the ability to reconstruct images with varying num-
ber of common variables (pixels in MNIST images). The more commonality there is
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Figure 4.8: Simulation results - varying δ: reconstruction loss (the loss relative to the
original images) as a function of δ and ε. Each line corresponds to a different level
of δ, where larger noise (smaller δ) means lower tolerance to re-identification. Large
noise in this plot corresponds δ = 10−5. Small noise: δ = 10−2. No noise means no
privacy guarantees at all, and acts as a reference. Learning rate is η = 2 · 10−4 and
common variables are 300 pixels of the 784 pixels in each digit.
between datasets, the better the reconstruction, and the faster the model runs. Data
holders who wish to split datasets may try their split (vary not only the number of
common variables, but also which variables remain common) and test the reconstruc-
tion loss with varying ε and δ as well, to test the privacy measures for the specific
context.
Beyond the tuning of the DP parameters, other running parameters can be tuned
to improve reconstruction loss. Some of these relate to the underlying structure of
the VAEs – namely the size of the vector Z of latent encoding, or the size of the
hidden layer in the Neural Network. As seen in Figure 4.9, panels (b) and (c), while
too small latent representation in Z may result in greater loss due to the inability to
encode the data well enough, a value of Z which is too big may result in over-fitting,
and might also result in higher reconstruction loss. Hidden layer dimensions, though,


















Table 4.1: Results of data fusion – MNIST dataset: 10 MNIST digits, with varying
levels of noise added. The left side of each pair is the original digit. The right side is
the reconstructed digit after splitting and fusing the pixels: the middle 300 pixels are
common across datasets, and the rest are unique for each of the two datasets. The
upper row is with no added noise. The next rows are with varying levels of ε and δ
values. Smaller ε means the privacy budget is lower, therefore more noise is added to
the DP-SGD, as explained in Subsection 4.3.3.1.
4.5 Proposed Application: Anonymous Survey and CRM
Data
To illustrate the managerial relevance of PPDF, we’ll now describe the planned
fusion of two unique datasets, both stemming from a matchmaking website intended
for extramarital affairs.
The data that will be used for estimation is from a website that specializes in ex-
tramarital relationships (hereafter “service” or “website”), a social network marketed
for people seeking affairs. The website offers search tools for potential affair mates
and several types of messaging tools. The goal of this exercise is to complement a
rich behavioral CRM dataset with anonymous survey responses. The survey includes
attitudes and stated preferences, and our primary goal with PPDF is to fuse them,
as well as learn both about their joint distribution (e.g., learn how stated affair goals
end up in eventual choices and attitudes towards affair-seeking (among those that
actively engaged in it) without ever identifying a single user within either dataset.
The study was conducted in collaboration with the affair-seeking website to learn
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Figure 4.9: Simulation results – varying tuning parameters: reconstruction loss (the
loss relative to the original images, upper panels) and running time (lower panels)
as a function of the number of common variables (panel (a)), length of hidden layer
(panel (b)) and length of Z – the latent representation of the encoders. Learning rate
is η = 2 · 10−4. All simulations ran for 25 epochs. Number of common variables, if
doesn’t vary, is 300 pixels of the 784 pixels in each digit. Hidden Layer dimension, if
doesn’t vary, is 400. Latent representation – Z dimension – if doesn’t vary, is 25.
more about attitudes and antecedents of online affair-seekers. Our research team6,
similarly to many firms with a CRM system and a complementary dataset, aimed
to apply data fusion techniques. Our goal was to fuse the detailed survey results
with the rich behavioral CRM data, in order to gain greater insight on attitudes and
behaviors of online affair-seekers. However, we soon recognized that customers’ iden-
tities might effectively be uncovered (e.g., customer IDs, demographics, preferences).
Though this is an extreme example of data sensitivity, where an actual risk of being
revealed as an affair-seeker may result in personal and social backlash, many other
data fusion exercises may result in identification of customers. Such revealed sensitive
information may harm individuals, damage brand equity, as well as result in litigious
6Research team of overall project: Longxiu Tian, Dana Turjeman, Fred Feinberg, Elizabeth
Bruch, and Dan Ariely. The proposed Privacy Preserving Data Fusion method is authored by
Longxiu Tian and Dana Turjeman.
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and regulatory ramifications. The proposed method will allow fusing of the survey
with behavioral data, without harming the privacy of the customers.
We’ll now describe the available data that will be used to illustrate PPDF’s abil-
ities.
4.5.1 CRM Data
Male users of the service are either “Guests” or “Full Members”. Both Guests and
Full Members must register in order to enter the website, by providing valid email
address and personal information, as will later be described. The website is so-called
“Freemium” website; guests have minimal access to the service’s features: they can
use the search tool and explore the site, but cannot initiate any conversation. Full
Members have, in addition to the search tools, full access to the site’s features. In
order to become a Full Member, male users need to pay for credits. They can use
the credits to interact with people on the site, e.g., initiate conversations and/or send
gifts. Women, on the other hand, do not need to pay in order to use these features,
and are considered Full Members automatically. This strategy is used in order to
encourage women to be active on the website.
A person who wishes to join the website must register with valid email address,
and to fill out a profile, which contains:
1. Demographics such as country, state, city, zip, gender, ethnicity and date of
birth.
2. Description of looks: eye color, hair color, weight, height, etc.
3. Sexual preferences, and preferences for type of affair/relationship that is being
sought.
The data stem from all full members from the United States, that is, paid men
and all women, who are registered as United States members. Therefore, our dataset
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adequately captures all the website’s users from the U.S. who can send messages to
one another.
The data were collected from January, 2014 through August, 2015. However, for
evaluation purposes of this model, we use only the data of users that joined the website
from January 1st, 2014 to October 31st, 2014, in their activities up to December 31st,
approximately two months after the survey. This, in order to include users that were
members of the website when the survey took place. In this pre-stated subsample,
there are approximately one million users, all uniquely identified by their user id, a
unique number that is assigned to a user upon registration and cannot be changed.
Some users altered some of their attributes (such as marital status, appearance,
etc.) at different times after joining the website. Therefore, we decided to take the
first observation of each user. If there is a missing value in this observation7, for the
purposes of this exercise, we will complete the missing value from a later observation
of the same user. The reason for taking the first observation is that it seems that some
of the fields, such as date of birth, are being updated to a value that will be more
attractive to other members, after joining the website. While the reasoning behind
such an update will be discussed in a different scope, we hereby explicitly assume
that the first input for each field is the one to better reflect the true attributes of the
user.
Among all users in the database, women are 39% and men are 61%. 70.1% of
users are Caucasian, 8.1% are Afro-American, 7.9% are Hispanic, 2.8% are Asian and
0.2% are First Nations (Native Americans); this attribute also allows for responses of
“Other” or “Rather not say”. Figure 1 shows the distribution of ethnicity, compared
to the survey respondents that will be described shortly.
7Users must fill in every field, other than optional text fields. Despite this obligation, the CRM
data contain observations that have missing values. This is due to changes in the website — users
that joined before certain time were allowed to leave some variables blank, and some data that we
received from the company might have data that was recorded only when the user was first active,
and not immediately upon joining. For the current illustration of PPDF, the missingness that is of
most relevance is that of date of birth, where missing values account for less than 3%.
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Our data contain individual level occurrences of messages, with both sender and
receiver user IDs, as well as searches made on the website. The searches are especially
rich, and may enable us to learn the preference of the users on the website, and the
result: whether to message or not.
4.5.2 Survey Responses
We collaborated with the website, and conducted a unique survey among the
website’s users. All users on the websites received an email, and 5,461 users completed
it within two days in 2014. Descriptions of the data are provided in a limited form,
according to the restrictions of our Non-Disclosure Agreement.
During September and October 2014, we sent a survey link via an email to all
registered United States users of the website, regardless of their membership status.
The incentive for participation in the survey was that each participant who completed
the survey is entered into a drawing to win 1,000 credits on the website, which is
roughly equivalent to $290. A limitation of the incentive is that women, who do not
need credits in order to initiate contact on the website, are differentially incentivized
to participate. This might explain why, among all users who completed the survey
and filled in their gender, 95% are men and only 5% are women, even though the
email was sent to all users.
Participants in the survey had the option to skip any questions they didn’t feel
comfortable responding to. None of the questions were mandatory, but, as can be
seen in Appendix 4.7.1 and Appendix 4.7.2, survey respondents answered most of
the questions. Questions that are relevant to subgroup of respondents, such as those
that relate to spouses, have lower response rates because only participants who stated
they have spouse were asked to answer such questions. Open ended questions received
lower rate of responses (2%-14%) for obvious reasons.
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4.6 Summary
In this paper, we presented a Privacy Preserving methodology for data fusion.
Using a combination of state-of-the-art methodologies, we created a latent represen-
tation of the joint distribution of two completely remote datasets, with differential
privacy built into the creation. Once constructed, any query regarding this joint
distribution can be responded to.
The challenges of marketing automation and analytics in the era of data privacy
are ongoing and multifaceted. This project aims to understand how data fusion, a
prevalent marketing analytics technique, can be better retooled to meet today’s new
privacy standards and practices. Our methodology offers a practical solution to col-
lecting and storing less data. We show that collecting less data does not mean forgoing
the advantages and insights that existing data fusion techniques allow. Using PPDF,
companies can safely fuse datasets without their “ever meeting one another”, and
potentially even split data, thus protecting customers’ fundamental right to privacy
and reducing the risks associated with data breaches and leaks.
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4.7 Appendices
4.7.1 A1: Summary Statistics of Survey
Figure 4.10: Survey Summary Table #1
114
Figure 4.11: Survey Summary Table #2
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Figure 4.12: Survey Summary Table #3
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Figure 4.13: Survey Summary Table #4
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4.7.2 A2: Response Rates for a Sample of Survey Questions
Question Responses Percent
What is your gender? 5424 99%
How old are you? 5443 100%
What is your race? 5433 99%
What is your race?-TEXT 84 2%
What is your highest level of education? 5430 99%
Are you currently working for pay? 5415 99%
Please indicate your approximate yearly household income
before taxes
5381 99%
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican,Democrat, Independent, or some...
5409 99%
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, Democrat, Independent, or some...-TEXT
260 5%
Which of the following best represents how you think
about your own religion or spiritual life?
5397 99%
Which of the following best represents how you think
about your own religion or spiritual life? -TEXT
756 14%
To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? 4801 88%
How often do you take part in the services, activities, and
social life of a church or place of worship?
5422 99%
What is your current relationship status? 5431 99%
What is your current relationship status? -TEXT 115 2%
Have you ever been married? 2073 38%
How many times have you been married? 1468 27%
Including your present marriage, how many times have you
been married?
3353 61%
When you married for the first time, how old were you? 4812 88%
Does your current partner/spouse know you are on the
site?
3931 72%
How long have you been with your current partner/spouse? 3933 72%
What is the highest level of education that your
husband/wife/partner completed?
3928 72%
How old is your husband/wife/partner? 3930 72%
What race or ethnicity is your husband/wife/partner? 3929 72%
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